THE STORY OF SOUTH AFRICA

W. BASIL WORSFOLD


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OF
SOUTH AFRICA.

BY
W. BASIL WORSFOLD.

Second Edition.

London:
HORACE MARSHALL & SON,
Temple House,
E.C.

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CHAPTER I.

DISCOVERY AND COLONIZATION (1486—1557).

ON a September day in the closing year of the fifteenth century there was wonderful news in Lisbon. In the river lay a ship, full of silken stuffs, spices, pearls, and gold, taken on board in the far-off Indies, and brought direct to Europe. Vasco da Gama, the commander of the expedition of which this ship formed part, had discovered an ocean highway from Europe to Hindostan, and shown how the merchants of Lisbon could trade direct with India and China without the intervention of the Moors.

It was a welcome victory for Europe in the long struggle between the Cross and the Crescent. In the middle of this century the Turks had established themselves in the south-east of Europe; while the Moors, occupying the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean,

threatened to exclude the Christian vessels from the Levantine ports. The Turks and the Moors had thus become the middle-men through whose hands the trade of Europe with the East must pass. From the time of Prince Henry of Portugal—a prince who was cousin to our Henry V., the conqueror of Agincourt, and who was surnamed "The Navigator," from his devotion to the cause of maritime exploration—a succession of Portuguese seamen had steadily pursued the work of exploring the western coast of Africa. Steadily, but slowly; for their ships were small and they dare not venture far from land. They did not reach the Equator until 1471, and then the African coast stretched, as it seemed, endlessly to the southward, ever barring their advance to India and the East. At length, in 1486, in the reign of John II., one of these navigators, Bartholomew Diaz, succeeded in passing Cape Agulhas, the southernmost point of Africa, and proceeding eastwards planted a cross on the little island in Algoa Bay, which has since been called "Santa Cruz." Six years later, Columbus anchored off the Bahamas with the vessels provided for him by Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. A common purpose led Columbus to discover America and Diaz to discover the Cape of Good Hope. It was to bring the nations of Western Europe into direct trading communication with the East, by opening up a sea route to India. Columbus proceeded

to the East *westwards*, not knowing that a continent lay across his path, stretching almost from pole to pole. Diaz intended to go to the same goal *eastwards*, but the great tropical continent of Africa obtruded so far to the south that he would scarcely have reached its southern extremity had he not been driven by a storm for thirteen days to the southward. The rocky headland off which he encountered this terrible



The Colony of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope in 1795.

storm he proposed to name "the Cape of Storms"; but John, his royal master, said, "Not so; but call it rather the Cape of Good Hope, for by this cape shall we sail to India."

It proved worthy of its name. Ten years later, in July, 1497, Vasco da Gama left the Tagus; in November he reached the Cape; on

Christmas Day he touched at Natal,* and early in the next year he arrived at Calicut, on the west coast of Hindostan.

And now he was safe back in Portugal again. He had been away for more than two years, and he had lost more than two-thirds of his men; but he had placed Portugal first in the race for the Eastern trade, and brought her merchants a prospect of boundless commercial development. No wonder, therefore, that he was ennobled by the king, and that the title of "Admiral of the Eastern Seas" was granted to him and his descendants after him.

The Portuguese were not slow to take advantage of Da Gama's discovery. Avoiding, for the most part, the barren and inhospitable shores of the southern extremity of Africa, they occupied convenient harbours on the west and east coasts within the tropic zone, and, crossing the Indian Ocean, planted trading settlements on the coasts of Hindostan. From Hindostan they advanced to Malacca, and from Malacca they crossed to the fertile island of Java. Although most of these possessions have long since passed away from them to the Dutch and English, yet they have left unmistakable signs that they were the first comers. In the oldest quarters of the chief European settlements throughout the East, the traveller remarks the tall houses, with their well-screened windows, and the narrow streets, in

* Therefore so called (Dies Natalis).

which the Portuguese merchants and officials lived.

The Portuguese were followed by other nations of Western Europe, and in course of time Spanish, Dutch, English, and French sailors found their way round the Cape of Good Hope to the East Indies. In the opening year of the seventeenth century the Dutch and English began to compete hotly for the Eastern trade. The merchants of both nations endeavoured to secure the larger share for themselves by organising their resources in trading corporations recognised by their respective Governments. The English East India Company was incorporated by Queen Elizabeth in 1600, and the Dutch East India Company received its charter in 1602. It is noticeable that the first establishments of both these Companies were not made on continental India, but in the kingdom of Bantam, in the west of Java. The English Company subsequently withdrew their establishments from Java, but the Dutch remained there, and their settlement at Jakatra, to which they afterwards (1621) gave the name of Batavia, became the centre of the operations of the Company, and remains to-day the capital of the Dutch possessions in the East.

The Dutch and English, unlike the Portuguese, made the Cape their halfway-house to India, and in this way it, or rather Table Bay, came to be used as a convenient anchorage for the ships of both nations sailing to and from the East. But

the Dutch Company was the first to form a station there. The Directors were led to take this step through the wreck of one of their ships, the "Haarlem," in Table Bay. The crew managed to reach the shore, but they had to remain there for three months before they were taken off by the Company's homeward-bound fleet. This happened in the year 1648; and three years later, as a result of the favourable report of the character of the country made by two members of the shipwrecked crew, a small expedition, consisting of three ships with about 200 persons on board, was despatched to the Cape under the command of a surgeon, Jan Antony van Riebeck. The little fleet left the Texel on December 24th, 1651, and on Sunday morning, April 7th, 1652, it lay at anchor in Table Bay.

The object of the Directors was very simple. They wanted a station where their ships could take in a supply of fresh meat and vegetables, and their soldiers and sailors could recruit. Van Riebeck was, accordingly, ordered to erect a wooden building for the invalided men, to plant gardens, to construct a fort capable of holding 70 or 80 men, and to treat the natives kindly and encourage them to bring their cattle and sheep for sale or barter.

In this trivial manner a task so great as the colonization of South Africa was commenced. The foundation of the station at the Cape was a

mere incident in the business of the Dutch East India Company, and the station itself was a mere dependency of the group of Eastern settlements administered by the Council of India, which sat at Batavia, in Java.

The spot where this handful* of Europeans were planted is one of the most startling scenes of natural beauty to be found in the whole world. Above their heads there towered for 3,500 feet into the clear blue sky, a vast, square mass of granite, flanked by a steep conical eminence to the east, and two lesser and more rounded eminences to the west. The base of the mountain was fringed with a slight growth of foliage, and from this point the land fell gently to the sands, and to

> The sea-waves' countless dimpling

in the circle of the bay.

Table Mountain, as this square mass with its level top had naturally been called by the Portuguese navigators, is the head of a range which runs southward for thirty miles, and terminates in the rocky promontory which is the actual "Cape of Good Hope." The Table range is the backbone of the little Cape Peninsula, which, running beside the mainland, forms with it two bays—Table Bay to the north, and False Bay to the south. On the eastern side the range is well wooded, and throws off spurs which

* The permanent residents (including women) amounted to little more than 100 in number.

gradually sink into the low plains of sandy scrub which join the peninsula to the mainland. When the Dutch ascended their watch-house on the Devil's Peak, as the eastern eminence was called, they could see these silvery plains stretching far into the interior, until they were bounded by the blue peaks of the Hottentots' Holland Mountains.* And behind these mountains the unknown interior extended northwards to the Equator, and eastwards to the Indian Ocean. The little Van Riebeck knew about it came from the Portuguese. Far away to the northward lay the kingdom of the "Great Lord," marked Monomotapa on the maps, the region whence the Arab traders whom the Portuguese navigators encountered on the east coast said they got supplies of gold. But between them and this land of gold were successive ranges of barrier mountains, and great plains traversed by wandering clans of Hottentots, and infested by a diminutive race called "Bushmen" by the Dutch. Close by them, on the shores of Table Bay, was a mischievous tribe, whose captain, "Harry," had been on a voyage in an English ship, and so learnt to speak the language of their hated rivals. Now and again the Peninsula was visited by clans of Hottentots, a people so little advanced in civilization that they had no fixed

* So called because the Dutch drove the Hottentots behind them, telling them that *their* Holland was on the other side of the mountains.

residences, and held in common the herds of cattle which formed their sole property.

Both these peoples were yellow-skinned, not black. They were weak races, who have almost died away before the advance of the Europeans. But far away to the eastward, beyond the mountains, across the level Karoo plains, and then over many miles of barren uplands, the rolling veldt of South Africa, rose the great mountain ranges, with peaks 10,000 and 12,000 feet in height, which run parallel to the eastern coast line ; and here, between the mountains and the Indian Ocean, where the rainfall is ample and the country is furnished with forests and clothed with luxuriant grasses, a more virile and prolific race, the dark-skinned Bantu, had already made their home. With these people, who were destined to contest the supremacy of race with the Europeans for a whole century, the settlers of the Dutch East India Company barely came in contact.

CHAPTER II.

THE DUTCH AND THE HOTTENTOTS.

THE shores of Table Bay, where Van Riebeck's company had established themselves, are exposed to the full heat of the sun; for Table Mountain looks northward to the Equator. But at the back of the mountain, in the curve which the westward-trending range forms with the eastward projection of the Devil's Peak, are cool valleys watered by mountain streams, and pastures sheltered by the mountain heights from the fiercest rays of the sun.

Five years after Van Riebeck's arrival, nine persons, soldiers and sailors, were discharged from the Company's service, and established behind the mountain on plots of land on the banks of the Liesbeck. By this step the Directors converted the station at Table Bay into a settlement. These "free burghers," as they were called, were provided with tools

and seeds, and were exempted from taxes for a term of years. That is to say, the Company provided them with land and capital, and gave them a fair start. On the other hand, they were practically prevented from doing more than make a bare livelihood by the regulations which the Directors framed in the interests of the shareholders in Holland. Under these regulations they were compelled to sell all, if necessary, of their produce to the Company at prices fixed by the Company itself. If there was more than was wanted, then they were allowed to dispose of this surplus to any foreign ships which might happen to come into the bay. But they were not likely to have much of this trade. For, in the first place, Van Riebeck (and other commanders after him) was bidden to "discountenance" the visits of foreign ships; and, in the second, the freemen were only allowed to go on board these ships after the Company's officers had themselves sold as much produce as they wished. Similarly, in dealing with the natives, they were required to buy cattle at the prices which the Company paid to the Hottentots, and to sell the cattle again solely to the Company, of course at the Company's price. It was not a very liberal way of treating them, but it was quite in accordance with the trade-policy of the Company, and with the ideas of those times. Such dealings were not peculiar to the

Dutch; for we English, too, originally regarded our colonies as existing mainly for the benefit of the parent state. But it is scarcely necessary to add that this theory of colonization has long been abandoned by England, and that it differs very widely from the modern practice, under which great self-governing communities have in the present century grown up in Canada, in Australia, and in this very colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

These signs of a permanent occupation of the country provoked the Hottentots to resistance. Up to the present the Dutch had suffered nothing worse than occasional raids upon their cattle, in one of which a herdsman had been murdered. But the Liesbeck settlers began to plough the land, and enclosed their holdings with fences; and when the Hottentots came to pasture their cattle, they found the grass-land broken up and access to the stream denied them. They, therefore, gathered in force, set fire to the homesteads, drove the settlers back to the shelter of the fort, and even attempted to take the fort by assault.

The communications which passed between Van Riebeck and the Indian and Home authorities, besides giving an interesting account of this affair, show clearly both the relation of the Cape settlement to the Indian Government, and the policy which the Directors of

the Company wished their representatives at the Cape to pursue towards the natives. In a despatch dated July 29th, 1659, Van Riebeck writes to the Governor-General and Council, Batavia, that "the Hottentots have been again at work." After adding that one of them who "spoke tolerable Dutch" had been taken prisoner, he continues:—

"Being asked why they did us this injury, he declared..... because they saw that we were breaking up the best land and grass, where their cattle were accustomed to graze, trying to establish ourselves everywhere, with houses and farms, as if we were never more to remove, but designed to take, for our permanent occupation, more and more of this Cape country, which had belonged to them from time immemorial..... that Doman had also put it into their heads that, after all the houses in the country were destroyed, the fort could be easily surprised—as the earth walls were built with a slope—and then the Dutch might be forced quite to abandon the country."

In reply to this the Indian Government wrote on December 15th, from "The Castle," Batavia, that the more important points must be left to "their Honors," the Directors in Holland; but that they could provisionally authorize Van Riebeck to increase the Cape garrison by soldiers obtained from passing ships. They added also that they "never

entertained any high idea of the Cape scheme—there was far too much said at the commencement of what we must now see turning out most unfortunately;" and prophesied that "the residency there, producing no return, would always be a burden on the Company."

From the diary which Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of the Directors, it appears that peace was made on April 6th, 1660. In his account he says that the Hottentots "insisted much upon their natural right of property," and that in order to silence them he had at last to fall back upon the right of conquest. "This word must out at last," he says; "that they had now lost that land in war, and, therefore, could only expect to be henceforth entirely deprived of it, the rather because they could not be induced to restore the cattle which they had, wrongfully and without cause, stolen from us; that their country had thus fallen to our lot, being justly won by the sword in defensive warfare, and that it was our intention to retain it."

The view which the Directors took of the affair was more humane. Under date of August 21st, 1660, they write that "the discontent shown by these people, in consequence of our appropriating to ourselves—and to their exclusion—the land which they have used for their cattle from time immemorial, is neither surprising nor groundless,

and we should, therefore, be glad to see that we could purchase it from them, or otherwise satisfy them."

Again, on September 30th, 1661, they write to Commander Van Harn—for Van Riebeck had been promoted to the Governorship of Malacca—that they "notice with some surprise the harsh treatment and other irregularities which you state that the Caepmans have sustained from our people there..... You must take care and establish such orders that the like may not happen again, but that, on the contrary, the said Caepmans, and all other native tribes, are kindly and civilly treated, so that, instead of any aversion, they may acquire an attachment, and become well disposed towards us."

These instructions to avoid further conflicts by purchasing the territory of the natives were not put into force until 1672. In that year, under the direction of a high official, Van Overbeke, the districts of "the Cape of Good Hope" and of "Hottentots' Holland" were purchased from their respective chiefs. The payment given by the Company in both cases consisted of "tobacco, beads, brandy, bread, and other trifles." The value of this consideration was very small to the Dutch; but, when we read that a whole sheep was bought for "a yard of thin copper wire," and three young ostriches for "2 oz. of tobacco," we must admit

that these articles probably represented a very considerable amount to the Hottentots. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that, however these purchases were carried out by the Company's officers, the Directors themselves wished to secure peaceable possession of the territories of the native chiefs by a policy of "acquisition by purchase." It was the policy which they pursued in Java; and in that country, which was the centre of their operations, they gradually bought up the rights of the various princes, so that the Company ultimately became the landlord of the entire island.

Moreover, when at one time they proposed to make a station in Natal, the captain of the ship which was to effect this purpose was directed to purchase "the bay of Natal and the adjoining land" from the native chief. The reason why the policy was not extended further in Africa, was, no doubt, the simple fact that, as the settlers gradually advanced into the interior, they only encountered wandering tribes, who, having no fixed place of residence, could scarcely be said to have "possession" of the soil. In fact, what is now the Cape Colony was almost as much an uninhabited country as Australia was when the English first formed settlements on its coasts.

Neither in this policy, nor in the instructions which the Directors issued ten years

later for the treatment of the slaves introduced from their eastern possessions and from Central Africa, do we find any trace of that feeling of aversion and contempt with which the Dutch afterwards came to regard the coloured races, both in the East and in South Africa. It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the vigour of the Dutch East India Company was beginning to decline, that these originally humane sentiments had become altogether lost. In the year 1754, in a code of remarkable severity issued from Capetown, the penalty of death was fixed for any slave who raised his hand against his master, while slaves who loitered outside the church doors at service-time were ordered to be severely flogged.

But to return to the Dutch settlers:

The first considerable expansion of the Cape settlement took place during the administration of Governor Simon Van der Stell. It was due partly to design and partly to a fortunate chance. At this time—that is, at the arrival of Van der Stell in 1679—the settlement contained some 300 men and about 90 women. But the Directors had determined to make an effort to increase the population; and shortly afterwards they sent out a body of 50 emigrants, which included a party of girls taken from the orphan asylums in Holland. These latter were especially welcome, as the settlers

were in want of wives. As a result of these measures, a settlement was formed in 1685, in a fertile valley at the foot of the Drakenstein mountains, about 30 miles from Capetown. This settlement, which was named Stellenbosch after the Governor, was the first advance into the mainland, and a "landdrost," or district magistrate, was established there.

In the same year the "Edict of Nantes," under which the French Protestants had enjoyed religious and civil freedom, was revoked. Large numbers of Huguenots fled to Holland, and a section of these expatriated Frenchmen accepted the offer of the Dutch East India Company, and determined to make a home in the distant settlement of the Cape of Good Hope. In this way it came about that, between the years 1688—1690, about 200 persons — men, women, and children — of French blood were introduced into the Cape settlement.

CHAPTER III.

THE HUGUENOT IMMIGRATION (1688-90).

THE bulk of the Huguenot immigrants had arrived at the Cape by May 6th, 1689. They met with a kind reception; the sick were kept at Capetown, and the rest were conveyed to the lands assigned to them. Some were settled in the neighbourhood of Capetown and Stellenbosch, but the majority were established in the Berg River valley; and at the head of this valley, in an angle formed by the Drakenstein and Hottentots' Holland ranges, a village grew up, called the French Hoek, or Corner. A collection amounting to 6,000 Rix-Dollars (£1,200) had been made for them in the Dutch Indies, and this sum, which was forwarded to the Cape by the Indian Government, was used to provide the refugees with a supply of tools and other necessaries. Thus equipped, they were able to commence the tillage of their lands; and here, in this

remote corner of the earth, they found a soil and climate even more suited by nature for the cultivation of the vine than the valleys of their own "sunny land of France." When the slips which they had brought with them grew up, they gave names to their vineyards and their farms which recalled the home-land; and so, to-day, the traveller is startled to find such names as Languedoc, La Rochelle, Lamotte, Rhone, and Champagne, scattered over the western valleys of the Cape Colony.

This French immigration was of great service to the Cape settlement. Not only was the mere accession of 200 people a matter of supreme importance to so small a community, but the French refugees formed a very desirable class of colonists. They were a good deal higher in the social scale than the Dutch and other settlers whom the Company had hitherto sent out. The majority of them were farmers and shop-keepers, but at their head was a nephew of Admiral Duquesne, and among them were members of the great houses of Du Plessis, De Mornay, Roubaix de la Fontaine, De Villiers, Le Sueur, Du Pré, and Rousseau. In any estimate we form of the character of the so-called Dutch at the Cape, it is necessary to bear in mind how large a proportion of French blood runs in their veins.

The policy which the Directors pursued

towards these French immigrants was one of extraordinary harshness, if we regard it from a nineteenth-century point of view. Van der Stell was ordered to take all steps necessary to cause the French to be completely absorbed in the Dutch settlers. A school-master was at once sent out, and the French children were compelled to learn the Dutch language. The Huguenots were not allowed to form separate communities, but were carefully mingled among the Dutch and German settlers. At first they were allowed to hold religious services in French, but at length even this privilege was withdrawn; while requests for a separate church organisation were stigmatized as "French impertinences," and at once denied. In the year 1709 they were forbidden to use the French language in official communications, and by the middle of the century the language had completely died out.

But this harsh policy can be justified by the special circumstances of the immigration. In the first place, the population of the settlement was very small. If we confine the term "settler" to those persons who intended to make the Cape their home, and so exclude the officials and the soldiers of the garrison, the Dutch settlers—including an admixture of Germans and other nations of North Europe—would be scarcely more numerous than the French. It would have been plainly very

inconvenient, and even dangerous, to have permitted this small community to be divided into two sections, each speaking a separate language, and having separate forms of worship and social customs. In the second, each of these French emigrants made a definite contract with the Company before he left Holland. Under the terms of this contract the Company undertook to provide the emigrant with a passage to the Cape, and to advance the necessary agricultural capital on his arrival there. On the other hand, the emigrant undertook to repay the value of the capital advanced, and to stay at least for five years. If he stayed no longer, he was then to pay for his passage out. In addition to this, each Huguenot took a very stringent oath of allegiance, in which he swore, among other things, to "observe and execute faithfully and in every detail (*de point en point*) the laws and ordinances" of the Company or its representatives. In going out on such terms as these the Huguenots had scarcely a right to complain; for they had deliberately put themselves in the power of the Company.

In other respects the Huguenots were better off than the rest of the Cape settlers. The bad treatment which they received was the result of the Company's system. Although the Directors wrote, in a despatch of June 17th, 1691, to Van der Stell: "Your charging

them fifteen guilders (florins) for a fathom of old rope, wanted to train their vines, is a thing unheard of," these petty exactions, and the more vexatious trade restrictions to which they were subjected, were ordinary incidents of the life of the settlement; while, on the other hand, the French, being better educated, were better able to take care of themselves; and, in fact, in 1707 they succeeded in upsetting the Government at Capetown. In this year, as a result of a memorial forwarded by them to Holland in 1704, Adrian Van der Stell, who had then succeeded his father as Governor, was removed, and the elder Van der Stell was required to give an account of the manner in which he had acquired his various properties at the Cape. After this affair, some of the refugees, among them their pastor, Pierre Simond, returned to Europe. But those who remained thrived, and in course of time became passionately attached to the land of their adoption. It is said that when Napoleon I. offered to restore the Du Plessis of that day to the dukedom which his Huguenot ancestors had forfeited, the Africander farmer refused to leave the Cape.

But for the present the Huguenots were justified in complaining that "the great tyranny of the French monarch from which they had fled was reflected in the petty despots who governed uncontrolled at the Cape of

Good Hope." These "petty despots" were now established in "the Castle Good Hope." This was a strong stone building which some years before had replaced the old fort with its earthen embankments. It still remains, and is used as the headquarters of the British Army in South Africa. Some idea of the rigorous etiquette enforced may be gathered from the following regulations issued by Governor Tulbagh, one of the mildest of the Company's Governors. They are sumptuary laws (*pracht en praal*):

Article 4. Of carriages.—Every person, without exception, shall stop his carriage and get out of it when he shall see the Governor approach, and shall likewise get out of the way so as to allow a convenient passage to the carriage of any of the members of the Council.

Article 6. Of large umbrellas.—No one less in rank than a junior merchant, and those among the citizens of equal rank, and the wives and daughters only of those who are, or have been, members of the Council, shall venture to use umbrellas.

Still, in spite of the mistaken trade-policy and the absurd administration of the Dutch East India Company, their settlement at the Cape gradually expanded. In 1700 the Franco-Dutch settlers climbed over the Drakenstein range at Tulbagh kloof (pass) and spread down the valley of the Breede river. In 1714 Capetown had become a considerable place, having 300 houses for its citizens. And the "free burgher" population of the settlement was returned as consisting of 647 men,

341 women, and 900 children, employing 93 men-servants, and owning 1,178 male and 240 female slaves.

In 1705 the Cape Government had encouraged the more enterprising settlers to advance into the interior by issuing "loan leases"; that is, licenses to occupy land temporarily for farming or grazing purposes. This was a bad system, for as the Company retained the right of resuming possession at any time, the farmers had no certainty of tenure, and so acquired a habit of moving from place to place, or "trekking"—a characteristic which the Boers have preserved to the present day. At the same time it tended to spread the European population, small as it was, over a wide extent of country. And accordingly we find that in 1745 it was necessary to establish a magistracy at Swellendam; while the Gamtoos river—almost as far eastward as the site of Port Elizabeth—was declared to be the limit of the colony.

The first dealings of the colonists with the dark-skinned races arose out of the migrations of the Swellendam farmers. In 1770 the Cape Government refused to issue any more "loan leases." They had received a report from the landdrosts of Stellenbosch and Swellendam, in which these officials complained that the farmers "did not scruple to wander about with their cattle, hither and thither, several

days' journey from their loan farms"; and that they then carried on an illicit traffic in cattle with the Hottentots and the so-called "Kafirs." Shortly after this decision, the Governor, Van Plettenberg, visited the eastern frontier, and in a conference which he held with the chiefs of the Kosa tribe it was agreed that the Fish river should be fixed as the boundary between the Europeans and the Bantu. As a matter of fact, the Kosas broke this compact at once. The next year they crossed the Fish river, murdered the peaceful Hottentots, and burnt the homesteads of the settlers. A "commando," or levy of all the able-bodied men, was held, and the Kafirs were driven back. Subsequently, in order to protect these eastern farmers, a landdrost was established at Graaf-Reinet, which lies at the foot of the Sneuberg mountains, on the further side of the Karoo plains.

In this way, by the end of the last century the experiment of the Dutch East India Company had resulted in the establishment of a settled European population in a few towns and villages in the extreme south-western corner of Africa, and in spreading scattered homesteads of farmers and graziers along the south coast, and northwards and eastwards in the interior, to the confines of the Bantu.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DECLINE OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY.

THE European population thus introduced probably amounted to about 25,000 persons. During a slightly longer period, 1620—1783, the colonies founded by Englishmen on the Atlantic sea-board of America had grown into a nation of little less than 4,000,000 people. Or, if we look at what has been done in South Africa since the introduction of British rule in the beginning of the present century, this record of Dutch colonization appears equally insignificant. And yet the mere bringing into existence of this meagre population was the sum of the Dutch East India Company's* achievement.

From the first the colony was regarded as the property of the Company, to be worked

* Under the constitution of the Company, practically all the commercial interests of Holland were represented on the Board of Directors, called "The Chamber of XVII."

for the benefit of the shareholders in Holland; and the colonists were held to be—and in fact, under the Company's system, were—mere servants or agents to whom the work of cultivation was entrusted. The principles which were applied in the establishment of the Liesbeck settlers were maintained during the entire period of its administration. The trade monopoly was so rigorously guarded that in 1779 we find the "burghers" presenting a petition to the Directors, in which they humbly pray to be allowed to make purchases directly in Holland instead of through the Company's stores at Capetown. They only ask for two ship-loads of goods a year, and by way of payment undertake to forward to the Company in Holland an amount of Cape produce sufficient, when sold by public auction, to defray the cost of these goods. Yet this moderate request was at once denied. In other words, these unfortunate people were absolutely debarred from external trade in any shape or form. In other respects they were treated with as little generosity. The "free burghers"—as the actual settlers were called by a singularly unhappy use of language—were denied the most elementary political rights. They had no hand in shaping the destiny of their country; they had no voice in its internal administration. Their knowledge of the very laws under which they lived was imperfect.

In this same petition they pray that printed copies of the laws and regulations of the Cape-town Government might be sent out from Holland ; or that a printing-press might be set up in the colony. This alternative is significant. It points to the astonishing fact that at this time—the end of the 18th century —printing was an art unpractised in this European community.

Here we touch the gravest fault of the Dutch East India Company's administration. The prohibition to trade meant that the Franco-Dutch settlers were prevented from having business relations with their kinsmen in Europe, or with other countries. The denial of political rights meant that one of the quickest avenues of social development—and one which is essential to the well-being of European communities planted in distant countries—was closed to them. But here was a still graver injury. Being practically cut off from literature (for the majority of the settlers had no books except the Bible and a metrical version of the Psalms), they were prevented not only from following the movements of European thought but even from acquiring the bare knowledge of the most conspicuous and far-reaching occurrences. In thus cutting off the Cape settlers from participation in the life of Europe, the Dutch East India Company must be held responsible for

the moral and social degradation of the community which they had brought into being.

In this account of the deterioration of the Franco-Dutch settlers we must add another circumstance not peculiar to them—for it was in operation among the English of the Southern States of America—but one which told with fatal effect upon a community thus isolated from European thought. The Cape settlers were slave-holders. In addition to the Asiatics and Central Africans introduced by the Company, a section of the Hottentots, together with the offspring of mixed marriages, had also been reduced to this condition. In moral evil, slavery is, perhaps, more fatal to the master than to the slave; and the Franco-Dutch, having lost touch with European civilization, readily acquired the cruelty and the license unhappily characteristic of the slave-proprietor.

This degradation of manners and isolation of thought was accompanied by the formation of a peculiar *patois*, the Africander dialect, or the *Taal*, which tended to intensify the original evils. Olive Schreiner has an interesting theory of the origin of the "taal." It is that the Huguenots, being compelled to learn Dutch, learnt it grudgingly, with as small an expenditure of time and trouble as possible. The counterpart of the "taal," therefore, is the "pigeon-English" of the

Chinaman, or the negro dialect of the Southern States. But there was a Nemesis. The coerced Huguenot in the course of the process of enforced amalgamation imposed his broken and mutilated forms of speech upon the Dutch settlers, with whom he intermarried. However this may be—whether, that is, the "taal" is to be attributed to this special Huguenot influence, or merely arose out of the general process of decivilization which set in under the illiberal policy of the Company—the effect was the same. The acquisition and use of this one meagre dialect has cut off the Boer from intercourse with his European kinsmen through the medium of literature, and has so prevented him from assimilating modern ideas, even when under British administration every opportunity for development was afforded.

The reality of the barrier thus erected around the Boer will appear from the description of the "taal" which Olive Schreiner gives:

"The Dutch of Holland is as highly developed a language, and as voluminous and capable of expressing the finest scintillations of thought, as any in Europe. The vocabulary of the Taal has shrunk to a few hundred words, which have been shorn of almost all their inflections, and have been otherwise clipped. The plurals, which in Dutch are

formed in various and complex ways, the Taal forms by an almost universal addition of an 'e'; and the verbs, which in Dutch are as fully and expressively conjugated as in English or German, in the Taal drops all persons but the third person singular. Thus the verb 'to be,' instead of being conjugated as in the Dutch of Holland and in analogy with all civilized European languages, thus runs :—'Ik is, je is, hij is, ons is, yulle is, hulle is'—which would answer in English to—'I is, thou is, he is, us is, you is, they is!' And not only so, but of the commonest pronouns many are corrupted out of all resemblance to their originals. Of nouns and other words of Dutch extraction, most are so clipped as to be scarcely recognizable. A few words are from Malay and other native sources; but so sparse is the vocabulary, and so broken are its forms, that it is impossible in the Taal to express a subtle emotion or abstract conception, or a wide generalization; and a man seeking to render a scientific, philosophic, or poetical work in the Taal, would find his task impossible."

The growth of the "taal" had this disastrous effect: It rendered the rural section of the Franco-Dutch population of the Cape—the "Boers," or farmers, as we now call them—almost incapable of development under British administration. As we shall see in the sequel,

rather than bring himself into line with European thought and manners, the Boer expatriated himself; and having expatriated himself, he was allowed, through a mistaken policy on the part of the Home Government, to maintain his separate and isolated existence in the interior. And so, in the picturesque phrase of Olive Schreiner, the Boer to-day is merely "a child of the seventeenth century who has lived on into the nineteenth."

But the abuses of the Dutch East India Company's administration became too gross for the public conscience of Holland. In 1791 an attempt was made to reform its administration, but the report of the Commissioners-General only showed that its condition was hopeless. Soon afterwards the States-General took over the government of the Company's possessions in the east; and to-day these possessions form a colonial system which ranks second only to that of England. The Cape settlement was, of course, included in them; but meanwhile, before the transfer could be accomplished, a British force under Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig had occupied the Cape. The reason for this proceeding was very simple: England was at war with Napoleon, with whom the Dutch Government were in alliance, and it was necessary to prevent the French from using the Cape as a base of operations for attacking

British India, or harassing the Indian trade.

This occupation was temporary, and it terminated under the Treaty of Amiens, when for three years (1803—1806) the Cape was administered by General Janssens, who was appointed by the States-General of Holland. At this time—that is to say, while the Cape Colony was directly administered by the Government of Holland, and no longer by the Company—both political and commercial reforms were introduced. When, however, war again broke out between France and England, the Cape was again seized—this time not without a struggle—by a British force under Sir David Baird. In 1814 the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, held up to this time by right of conquest, was formally ceded by Holland to Great Britain under the terms of the Treaty of London. Among the conquests which England had won from the Dutch in the war with Napoleon, she retained the Cape, Ceylon, and part of Guiana; on the other hand, she restored Java and paid a sum of £6,000,000 to the Government of Holland.

CHAPTER V.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF BRITISH RULE (1806-1820).

AT the commencement of the period of British Rule, the population of Cape Colony consisted of 73,663 persons, of whom 26,720 were of European descent, 17,657 were Hottentots, and 29,256 slaves. The external trade was very small, for the imports amounted to about £100,000, and the exports to £60,000, in value. Nevertheless, owing to its importance as commanding the waterway to India, the early Governors of the Cape were men of higher position and capacity than the early Governors of the infant colony of New South Wales. Their several administrations were each marked by one or more well-intentioned measures of reform. For example, Lord Caledon, the first of the list, who arrived in 1807, improved the postal communication and initiated a system of circuit courts for the better administration of justice in the outlying districts. He also

issued, in 1809, a proclamation* which put an end to the enforced servitude of free Hottentot children under the name of "apprenticeship." Sir John Cradock, who succeeded in 1811, established schools in country districts; and, in order to lessen the nomadic tendencies of the Boers, he converted their "loan" farms into perpetual quit-rent properties. By this measure the Boers became practically free-holders of farms from 6,000 to 20,000 acres in extent. And Lord Charles Somerset, who was sent out in 1814 (in George III.'s phrase) to "fleece the Hottentots" on £10,000 a year, was no exception. Apart from his one conspicuous service (the introduction of a British population into the colony, which will be described in a separate chapter), he founded new townships, and took other measures to forward the industrial interests of the country. In particular he promoted the importation of sheep and so fostered the production of wool, which to this day remains the staple industry of the Cape Colony. Fine-wooled sheep had for the first time been successfully introduced (from Saxony) by Reitz and Van Breda in 1812. Lord Charles imported merinoes, and

* This was rescinded by Sir John Cradock in 1812. The Boers claimed as slaves all children of Hottentot women who married outside their own tribe, and all children of Hottentot mothers and European fathers. They also retained as slaves the children of free Hottentots who were their hired servants, up to the age of 25. Such children were called "apprentices."

established them in breeding-farms at Darling and at Somerset East; and in this way the success of the nascent industry was secured.

Nevertheless, capable and well-intentioned as were these men, all this time the threads of South African administration were getting into a hopeless tangle. And in that tangle they remained practically until the Bechuanaland settlement of 1885.

In the first place, the inevitable conflict between the Europeans spreading northward and eastward, and the Bantu crushing southward and westward between the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean, had commenced.

In accordance with the arrangement made by Van Plattenburg in 1778, the Great Fish River was maintained as the eastern border of the colony by the Dutch East India Company. Northward, the desert wastes afforded a natural barrier against the inroads of the dark-skinned peoples. Within the colony itself were the yellow-skinned Bushmen and Hottentots. The former of these had retired to the mountain wastes or desert plains.

> The Bushman sleeps within his black-browed den
> In the lone wilderness. Around him lie
> His wife and little ones unfearingly—
> For they are far away from "Christian men."
> No herds, loud lowing, call him down the glen;
> He fears no foe but famine; and may try
> To wear away the hot noon slumberingly;
> Then rise to search for roots—and dance again.

The Hottentots had been reduced to a state of passive submission by their Franco-Dutch masters.

> Mild, melancholy, and sedate, he stands,
> Tending another's flock upon the fields—
> His father's once, where now the white man builds
> His home, and issues forth his proud commands.

Both of these yellow races, the real aborigines of the Cape Colony, formed no exception to the general rule that coloured races tend to decline before the advance of civilization. But the dark-skinned tribes, forming part of the great Bantu family, and known to Englishmen only too well under the familiar names of Kafirs, Zulus, Matabele, and Bechuanas, instead of dwindling, have increased and multiplied under European control. In this respect South Africa forms a sharp contrast with Australia and North America. The effect of the partnership thus established may be expressed by adapting a phrase recently used,* and saying that, whereas in North America and Australia both brain and muscle are white, in South Africa the brain is white, and the muscle is black.

These sturdy and prolific Bantu, instead of retiring before the outposts of the Europeans, encroached upon the Colonial territory, and

* At the opening of the Buluwayo Railway, in November, 1897.

periodically over-ran the districts of Uitenhage and Graaf-Reinet.

> Lo! where he crouches by the cleugh's dark side,
> Eyeing the farmer's lowing herds afar;
> Impatient watching till the Evening Star
> Leads forth the twilight dim, that he may glide
> Like panther to the prey; with free-born pride
> He scorns the herdsman, nor regards the scar
> Of recent wound, but burnishes for war
> His assegai and targe of buffalo-hide.

And the object of the first Kafir war (1811-12) was to drive the Kosas back to the further side of the Great Fish River—that is, to secure the country up to the Dutch frontier. After this object had been accomplished, forts, with a military station at Grahamstown (so called after General Graham), were established along the border in order to prevent any future incursions.

The second Kafir war (1817-19) was more serious. It broke out during the administration of Lord Charles Somerset, and arose from an application of a policy which was pursued by the English Government with varying success for many years. The Home Government was neither willing, nor at that time able, to undertake the task of controlling and organising this great mass of dark-skinned people; at the same time they desired to prevent conflicts among the various tribes, and collisions between the Colonists and the Kafirs on the eastern border. It was thought, therefore, that the same results might be

practically secured, and at much less cost, by selecting certain powerful chiefs for alliance and rendering these chiefs responsible for the good behaviour of the tribes placed under their control. It was essentially a policy of half-measures, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it sometimes resulted in disaster. At the same time, we must remember that, having in view the circumstances and prospects of the colony at this epoch, the only alternative would have been to have abstained from entering into any friendly relationships with these native races, and then to have punished them with merciless severity when they had the temerity to attack the European settlements. Against such an alternative the conscience of England would have revolted; and it only remained, therefore, to adopt what was admittedly a makeshift.

In pursuance of this policy, Gaika was constituted supreme chief of all the Amakosas upon the border. Unfortunately, however, one of the chiefs placed under his control, Slhambi, aided by Makanna the prophet, rose against him, and drove him to the Winterberg mountains. From this refuge he sent to beg aid from his English allies. A force was sent to attack Slhambi, and in revenge for this interference the Amakosa chiefs, under Makanna, poured over the frontier, and almost succeeded in taking Grahamstown by

assault. The war was remarkable for this event—the only instance of a Kafir attack upon a European town—and for the voluntary surrender of Makanna to Captain Stockenstrom.

In this remarkable action the Kafir prophet is reported to have used words that are worthy of a Cato: "People say that I have occasioned the war; let me see whether my delivering myself up to the conquerors will restore peace to my country."* After this incident, which closed the war, the frontier was advanced to the line of the Keiskamma and Chumie rivers. At the same time an endeavour in the direction of civilizing the Kosa tribes was made; and a party of missionaries were despatched to work among them, under the protection of Gaika.

Shortly before this war an insurrection of the Dutch farmers occurred which was remarkable in itself, and which has acquired an altogether disproportionate importance from the fact that it was made the occasion for permanently embittering the relationship of the original settlers to the English administration. This was the insurrection of the Boers at Slaghter's Nek in 1815, and the subsequent execution of five of the rebels at

* Makanna was imprisoned in Robben Island. He met his death by drowning in endeavouring to escape to he mainland.

the same place on March 9th, 1816. The disturbance originated through the desire to avenge the death of a Boer named Bezuidenhout, who was shot in the act of resisting the officer of justice sent to arrest him (after trial) by the Colonial Government. The rebels never numbered more than fifty or sixty men; but, in addition to spreading disaffection among their fellow countrymen, they were guilty of the criminal offence of inciting the Kafirs to revolt by promising to give them the Zuurveldt—afterwards the district of Albany—if they would assist in driving the English out of the eastern province of the colony. The allegation which was used to excite the resentment of the whole Dutch population against the English Government, and which has since been repeatedly used for the same purpose, was this. It was said that the five men subsequently tried and shot by the Government had voluntarily surrendered to the force under Captain Fraser, and that, therefore, this execution of the rebels constituted a breach of faith. But the statement was false. Of the misguided band of "patriots" who assembled at Slaghter's Nek, thirty-nine did so surrender, but five of the more desperate escaped on horseback. Of these latter, four were afterwards intercepted while endeavouring to leave the colony with their waggons and cattle;

one, Hans Bezuidenhout, fought to the death, the others, Faber and the two Bothmas, surrendered when they saw that resistance was impossible. The five men who were shot consisted of Faber, the two Bothmas, De Klerk (who had escaped from Slaghter's Nek), and Hendrik Prinslo. Prinslo was the leader of the insurrection, and he had signed and despatched a letter to another Boer, Krugel, who lived in the north of the colony, desiring him to raise an insurrection in that district. This letter came into the hands of Field-Commandant Van Wyk, and Hendrik Prinslo was at once arrested by a force sent for this purpose by Captain Andrews. The actual insurrection took place after Prinslo's arrest and in spite of the indication which it afforded that the Government was aware of the proceedings of the rebels. Krugel, originally sentenced to death, was transported for life.

The whole affair is correctly described by the late Judge Cloete as "the most insane attempt ever made by a set of men to wage war against their sovereign," originating entirely in the unruly passions of a few persons who "could not suffer themselves to be brought under the authority of the law." Nevertheless, he adds that he knows from personal interviews with the descendants of the executed rebels that this punishment "left in their minds a far more indelible impression than

even their losses in the Kafir wars, or the abolition of slavery."

Undoubtedly this execution was used as an excuse for the unreasoning resentment which the Dutch rural settlers rapidly conceived against the English; but the real reasons for that resentment lie deeper. What divided (and still divides) the Dutch and English in South Africa, is the question of the treatment of the native races.

I have already indicated the causes which led to the moral deterioration of the Franco-Dutch settlers. Evidence, only too conclusive, of the fatal character of this deterioration, is afforded by the extraordinary circumstances which led to the death of Bezuidenhout—the immediate cause of the Slaghter Nek rebellion.

In 1814, a Hottentot, named Booy, complained to the magistrate at Cradock that his master, Frederick Bezuidenhout, refused to allow him to leave his service, or to remove his effects. The field-cornet was instructed to go to Bezuidenhout's farm and make enquiries. He did so, and found that Booy's time of service had expired, and that, therefore, under the colonial law, he was free to leave. But Bezuidenhout, although he admitted the facts to be as the Hottentot had stated, refused to comply with the magistrate's order. He declared that he "considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and his

Hottentot, to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights." And, telling the field-cornet that he defied both him and the magistrate who had ordered him to come on this absurd errand, he beat the Hottentot and bade *him* "go and tell the civil authorities that he would treat them in the same manner, if they should dare to come upon his grounds to claim the property of a Hottentot."

After this, Bezuidenhout was summoned to appear before the district court. He treated the summons with contempt, and threatened the officers who delivered it, with violence. In 1815 his case was brought before the judge of the high court, on circuit, at Graaf-Reinet. He refused to appear, and was sentenced for contempt of court. The under-sheriff was despatched with a military escort to take Bezuidenhout and give effect to this sentence. On the advance of the party the Boer retired to a cave, which he had previously furnished with food and ammunition, and with two assistants, whom he compelled to follow him, proceeded to open fire with his long elephant gun upon his assailants. At length, he exposed himself and was killed by a ball from the gun of one of the Hottentot soldiers posted on the opposite bank of the Bavians' River.

This is a significant narrative; but the result of this conduct is still more remarkable.

Although nothing could be more immoral—and, indeed, anti-social—than the behaviour of this misguided man from first to last, yet the principles upon which he based his mad defiance of the law were approved by his Dutch neighbours, and his own fate excited so keen a feeling of sympathy that the oath of vengeance which was taken over his corpse gave rise to the rebellion of Slaghter's Nek.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MISSIONARIES.

THE relations of the English Government to the Dutch settlers were further complicated by the results of missionary enterprise. This was a factor of great importance in the subsequent history of South Africa. On the one hand, it powerfully enlisted the sympathy of the English people for the native races; and on the other, it undoubtedly increased the difficulties of administration by emphasizing the differences of sentiment and character which already divided the old settlers from the English officials, and afterwards from the English colonists.

The earliest missionary efforts were due to the Moravian brethren, who established a station in the neighbourhood of Swellendam before the close of the Dutch period. In 1798, Dr. Van der Kemp was sent out by the London Missionary Society. He worked at first among the Kafirs, but he afterwards confined his

efforts to the improvement of the Hottentots on the eastern border of the colony. In 1802 he established a Hottentot Mission, through the co-operation of General Dundas (the Lieutenant-Governor under the temporary British occupation), in the neighbourhood of Fort Frederick, a military post on the shores of Algoa Bay. The site of the mission was afterwards removed, under instructions given by General Janssens, further inland to Bethelsdorp, on the Zwartkops river. Dr. Van der Kemp and his assistants came to be looked upon as the protectors of the Hottentots, and in this capacity they incurred the hostility of the Dutch farmers in the frontier districts. On the institution of circuit courts by Lord Caledon in 1811, a number of charges were brought forward through the agency of Dr. Van der Kemp and the Rev. John Read, in which almost all the burgher families on the frontier were accused of acts of violence or oppression committed against the Hottentots and slaves working on their farms. According to Cloete's account, altogether 100 families were involved in these proceedings, and 1,000 witnesses were summoned and examined. Moreover, the accused parties, under the then law of the colony, even when shown to have been innocent, were compelled to pay heavy law expenses. The cases were not finally disposed of until the third session of the circuit court,

and Cloete, who was himself registrar of the court, sums up the results of the trials in the following sentence: "Of the long list of atrocious crimes thus enquired into with the utmost care and impartiality, not one single instance of murder was proved against the accused, although, in a few cases, acts of personal assault and transgression of some colonial law were brought home to them and punished accordingly."

Whether this account of the facts, as thus presented by Cloete, be correct or not, it at least affords sufficient evidence that the relations between the Boers and the Government were not likely to be improved by the introduction of the missionary factor. And, indeed, the Eastern Boers came to distrust the new courts as institutions established in the interests of the Hottentots. On the other hand, the odium incurred by the Bethelsdorp missionaries was so great that all missions and all missionary enterprize in the colony came to be regarded as a source of public danger, and the missionaries themselves were looked upon with grave suspicion by the Government.

Six years later (in 1818), in view of this critical condition, the London Missionary Society selected Dr. Philip, and despatched him to the Cape to act as general superintendent of their missions in South Africa. Almost from the date of his arrival in

Capetown, Dr. Philip was engaged in constant conflicts with the Colonial Government and the local officials.

Into the details of this controversy it is impossible to enter, although it will be necessary to return to the part played by Dr. Philip on a subsequent occasion. But the broad results of the conflict must be indicated. It was part of the movement which resulted in the complete emancipation of the coloured races within the Cape Colony, and, indeed, of the coloured races throughout the Empire. For Pringle, the secretary of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, was moved to embrace the cause of the coloured races by his experience of the evils of slavery in Cape Colony. In his sonnet "To Oppression," he writes:

> I swear, while life-blood warms my throbbing veins,
> Still to oppose and thwart with heart and hand
> Thy brutalizing sway—till Afric's chains
> Are burst, and freedom rules the rescued land—
> Trampling oppression and his iron rod.

The several steps which led to this result were as follows. In 1822, Commissioners were appointed, through the efforts of Wilberforce and Buxton, by the Home Government, to enquire into the condition of the Hottentot population in the Cape Colony. On April 28th, 1828, Dr. Philip's book, "Researches in South Africa," was published; and as a result of the body of evidence thus presented directly

to the English people, General Bourke's famous ordinance, declaring the free coloured population of the colony equal in law to the Europeans, was issued in July, through the direct initiative of the Home Authorities. The bill for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire was carried five years later (in 1833).

Dr. Philip was preceded by Robert Moffat, who left England in October, 1816. Moffat was destined to work in the northern deserts, beyond the colonial frontier, at Kuruman in Bechuanaland. Here, Moffat, Livingstone—who married Moffat's daughter, Mary—and afterwards Mr. John Mackenzie, fought the battle of the native races against the immigrant Boers, and did yeoman service to the Empire by keeping open the northward route to south-central Africa. Owing to the distrust with which all missionaries were regarded at this time, the Government at first refused to allow Moffat to proceed to the interior. While he was thus detained at Capetown he occupied himself with learning Dutch. This knowledge was afterwards useful in his passage through the colony to the interior. One scene—which is described in his Life, written by his son, Mr. John Moffat—is instructive, as giving us additional evidence of the attitude of the Dutch farmers towards the coloured people. He was hospitably entertained in a Boer

farmhouse. Supper ended, a clearance was made, the big Bible and the Psalm-books were brought out, and the family seated. "But where are the servants?" asked Moffat. "Servants! What do you mean?" "I mean the Hottentots, of whom I see so many on your farm." "Hottentots! Do you mean that, then? Let me go to the mountains and call the baboons, if you want a congregation of that sort. Or, stop! I have it—My sons, call the dogs that lie in front of the door—they will do."

Thereupon Moffat selected as his text, "Even the dogs eat of the crumbs....." The old Boer was so much moved that he rose, and summoned the despised Hottentots. Afterwards he said to Moffat, "My friend, you took a hard hammer, and you have broken a hard head."

At the risk of anticipating the course of my main theme, I will endeavour very briefly to indicate the chief results of missionary enterprize in South Africa.

The value of missionary work as a civilizing agency was recognized by two of the foremost African administrators, Sir George Grey and Sir Bartle Frere. The first of these, who became Governor of the Cape Colony in 1854, made the establishment of mission stations and mission schools part of his new and successful Kafir policy. In fact, the native policy of the

Colonial Government since this date (1855) is well expressed by the words of Mr. Noble.* It has been "to establish and maintain peace, to diffuse civilization and Christianity, and to establish society on a basis of individual property and personal industry. The agencies employed are the magistrate, the missionary, the school-master, and the trader."

At the present time, missionary enterprize is recognized by the Colonial Government as one of the most powerful assistants in maintaining order and in developing the vast masses of dark-skinned Bantu which have been placed under their jurisdiction. One-third of the education grant of the Cape Colony is, on an average, devoted to the support of mission schools and trade schools. Perhaps the most remarkable of these institutions is the Kafir college of Lovedale. A mission was founded here in 1824; in 1841 it was developed into a training college by Govan, and it was reorganised by Dr. Stewart in 1863. Writing of this institution, Mr. Donald Ross says, in the report of the Inspector-General of Education for the Cape Colony: †

"Of all the native institutions, I was most favourably impressed by Keiskamma Hoek and Lovedale. The latter works on a grand scale. A visit to Lovedale would convert the

* History of South Africa.

† Report of 1883.

greatest sceptic regarding the value of native education ..... the institution as a whole is probably the greatest educational establishment in South Africa; and that with the greatest range in its scholastic operations, the utmost boldness in its plan and prospects, and the most perfect order in its organization and administration."

Additional and conclusive evidence of the practical value of these educational efforts among the natives is afforded by this notice, which appears in the hand-book periodically issued for the information of intending emigrants to South Africa, from the Government office at Westminster: "It should be remembered that large numbers of Malays and other coloured men, in all parts of Cape Colony, *now compete with whites as skilled mechanics* at lower wages."

"Compete with whites as skilled mechanics!" We can fancy the astonishment and the incredulity with which such a statement would have been received by the old colonists, or even by the officials of the Colonial Government, in the year 1820.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ALBANY SETTLEMENT.

UP to 1820 the Cape Colony was a foreign possession administered by an English Government. The subjects of this Government were the Franco-Dutch settlers, their slaves, and the Hottentots. With these we have been concerned hitherto, but we have had nothing to do with any Englishmen, for up to this date the only English were officials, merchants, and missionaries.

The introduction of the first considerable British population into South Africa—known familiarly as the Albany Settlement—was the work of Lord Charles Somerset. In the course of the second Kafir war, he became acquainted with the character of the country westward of the Great Fish River. It seemed to him to be "unrivalled in the world for its beauty and fertility," and he therefore urged the Home Government to introduce a body of British emigrants into this part of the Cape

Colony. Apart from the obvious advantage of introducing 5,000 Englishmen into a possession in which the European population as yet consisted of 42,000 persons almost exclusively of alien descent, there were two reasons which made the district proposed especially suitable. In the first place, an English population would tend to steady the wild and discontented burghers of the frontier districts, and in the next, it would form a rampart against the increasing pressure of the Kafir tribes.

Lord Charles Somerset's proposal was readily taken up by the Government and the nation. Parliament voted £50,000 for the cost of transporting and establishing the settlers; and 90,000 persons were prepared to emigrate. From among those who offered themselves and their families, some 5,000 persons were selected; and in the year 1819-1820 they were safely conveyed across the sea and landed on the shores of Algoa Bay. The majority of the emigrants were established in the district enclosed between the Fish and the Bushman rivers, and from this district of Albany they gradually spread northwards and westwards. In this way towns grew up at Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown*; and the Eastern province of the Cape Colony assumed the predominantly English character which

* Formerly military stations.

makes it contrast with the Western province to this day.

Among the emigrants were a number of Scotsmen. This "Scotch party" was rendered conspicuous by the fact that it included a very interesting personality, Thomas Pringle, the South African poet. Pringle remained in the secluded valley, which he called "Glen Lynden," directing and sharing the exertions of his fellow-colonists, until 1822. He was then summoned to Capetown to fill the office of sub-librarian of the South African Public Library, a position which was offered him through the influence of Sir Walter Scott. He returned to England in 1826, and he subsequently became secretary to the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, and one of the chiefs of the Abolition movement.

Apart from his South African poems, from which extracts have already been made, Pringle recorded in prose the impressions which he experienced as an emigrant. His accounts, at once vivid and exact, present us with a charming picture of this important episode in the history of South Africa.

As the "Brilliant," with the Scotch party on board, sailed past the southern coasts on its way to Algoa Bay, the emigrants crowded on deck to view the country of their adoption. "As we passed headland after headland," he writes, "the sylvan recesses of the bays and

mountains opened successively to our gaze, like a magnificent panorama, continually unfolding new features, or exhibiting new combinations of scenery..... The aspect of the whole was impressive, but sombre; beautiful, but somewhat savage. There was the grandeur and the grace of Nature, majestic and untamed; and there was likewise that air of lonesomeness and dreary wildness which a country unmarked by the traces of human industry, or of human residence, seldom fails to exhibit to the view of civilized man."

As they neared Algoa Bay, the coast-line grew more tame; but the prospect of disembarking after the long, monotonous voyage made up for any deficiencies in the scenery, and the emigrants landed in excellent spirits. The scene which was presented on this afternoon of May 15th, 1820, he thus describes:

"Around us, in the west corner of the spacious bay, were anchored ten or twelve large vessels, which had recently arrived with emigrants, of whom a great proportion were still on board. Directly in front, on a rising ground a few hundred yards from the beach, stood a little fortified barrack or block-house, called Fort Frederick, occupied by a division of the 72nd Regiment, with the tents and pavilions of the officers pitched on the heights around it. At the foot of these heights,

nearer the beach, stood three thatched cottages, and one or two wooden houses brought out from England, which now formed the offices of the Commissaries and other civil functionaries appointed to transact the business of the emigration, and to provide the settlers with provisions and other stores, and with carriages for their conveyance up the country. Interspersed . . . . . were depôts of agricultural implements, carpenters' and blacksmiths' tools . . . . . furnished to the settlers at prime cost. About two furlongs to the eastward . . . . . lay the camp of the emigrants."

The location assigned to the "Scotch party" was the upper part of the valley formed by the Bavians' (or Baboons') River, a tributary of the Great Fish River.* To this "rugged mountain glen" the emigrants were guided by an escort commanded by an Africander field-cornet. Travelling was difficult from the first, but at length, as they ascended higher, the waggon-track disappeared altogether. "Then," he writes, "we were literally obliged to hew out our path up the valley through jungles and gullies, and beds of torrents, and rocky acclivities, forming altogether a series of obstructions which it required the utmost exertions of the whole

* The river was subsequently named the Lynden; and it is now included in the district of Bedford, Cape Colony.

party, and of our experienced African allies, to overcome."

Altogether, five days were consumed in ascending the glen. Of these, two were occupied in hewing a path through a defile only three miles in length. At last the summit of the ridge was reached and the head of the valley lay open before them. "And now, mynheer," said the field-cornet, "daar leg uwe veld—there lies your country." "Looking in the direction where he pointed, we beheld, extending to the northward, a beautiful vale, about six or seven miles in length, and varying from one to two in breadth. It appeared like a verdant basin, or *cul-de-sac*, surrounded on all sides by an amphitheatre of steep and sterile mountains, rising in the background into sharp cuneiform ridges of very considerable elevation; their summits being at this season covered with snow, and estimated to be from 4,000 to 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. The lower declivities were sprinkled over, though somewhat scantily, with grass and bushes. But the bottom of the valley, through which the infant river meandered, presented a warm, pleasant, and secluded aspect; spreading itself into verdant meadows, sheltered and embellished, without being encumbered, with groves of mimosa trees, among which we observed in the distance herds of wild

animals—antelopes and quaggas—pasturing in undisturbed quietude.

"'Sae that's the lot o' our inheritance, then?' quoth one of our party, a Scottish agriculturist. 'Aweel, now that we've really got till 't, I maun say the place looks no sae mickle amiss.'"

As I have already mentioned, Pringle returned from his emigrant's cabin to civilization in 1822. His life at Capetown proved, however, to be more disturbed than his life in the mountain wilderness of Glen Lynden. His literary attainments made him a person of importance in the Cape community, and he was soon engaged in various useful and important undertakings. In addition to his official work at the library, he established and carried on a school at Capetown, and conducted a periodical called the *South African Journal*. In both of these enterprizes he had the assistance of Fairbairn, who had left Newcastle-on-Tyne for the Cape in response to Pringle's invitation. Early in 1824 he and Fairbairn undertook to edit the first newspaper published in the colony, the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, which had just been issued by Greig. It was in the course of this undertaking that Pringle came into collision with the arbitrary administration of Lord Charles Somerset. The attempt to establish a system of press censorship made by

the Colonial Government was met by the announcement that the issue of the paper would be discontinued pending an appeal to the Home Government. This appeal was successful; but Pringle found that his prospects at the Cape were blasted by the hostility of the Government officials, and he therefore resolved to return to England. But before he left the Cape he visited Glen Lynden, and took the opportunity of giving useful evidence to the Commissioners of Inquiry, who were now in the colony, on the subjects of local administration, the improvement of the condition of the coloured people, and on the protection of the eastern frontier. At the same time he bore testimony to the assistance which the Albany settlers had received from the Capetown administration. From the first day of his arrival on the location, he wrote, "every possible attention to the comfort, safety, and success" of the Scotch settlers had been shown by the Government officials, from Lord Charles Somerset downwards. This acknowledgment, he added, he made the more willingly, because he had been called upon "to convey very severe strictures on particular points in the recent administration of the Colonial Government."

Pringle took up the work of slave emancipation almost immediately after his return to England in 1826. In this movement his name

was associated with the names of Wilberforce, Buxton, Clarkson, Zachary Macaulay, and Brougham. He died, after seven years of arduous effort, on August 1st, 1834—almost the anniversary of the day on which the Abolition Act became law.

Meanwhile, before the Royal Commissioners had completed their task, Lord Charles Somerset obtained leave to return to England. Shortly afterwards he avoided the necessity of defending his Cape administration in the English Parliament by a voluntary retirement.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE EMIGRATION OF THE DUTCH FARMERS (THE BOERS).

THE Royal Commissioners presented their report to Parliament in 1826. The measures which they suggested for the better government of the Cape Colony were directed chiefly towards two objects, the improvement of the condition of the coloured races and the introduction of English institutions. It is not possible within the limits of these pages to do more than give the bare results of these measures. An Executive Council and Supreme Court were established; the Dutch system of local administration was replaced by the appointment of Resident Magistrates and Justices of the Peace; English was ordered to be used as the language of official communications and in the courts of justice; and (in 1828) General Bourke issued the famous "Ordinance 50," which placed the free coloured population under the same laws

as the Europeans. At the same time, the salaries of the high officials and the general expenses of administration were reduced. Most of these measures were unacceptable to the Dutch residents, who still formed, it must be remembered, about six-sevenths of the total population of the colony. They were followed by a more sweeping reform, which, just in itself, and necessary to the English conscience, was yet absolutely incomprehensible to the mind of the rural Africander—the abolition of slavery.

The Slave Emancipation Act, by which the institution of slavery was abolished throughout the Empire, received the royal assent on August 28th, 1833. The Act, as originally passed, established a period of seven years' apprenticeship during which the slaves were to be gradually prepared for the change in their condition, and the slave proprietors were to make the alterations necessary to adjust their industries to the employment of free labour. This period was subsequently shortened by two years, and in the case of the Cape Colony the five years ran from December 1st, 1833, to December 1st, 1838. The sum of £20,000,000 was voted by Parliament for the compensation of the slave-proprietors, and of this total, £1,247,000 was apportioned to the Cape Colony.

The value of the slaves held by the Cape proprietors was officially returned at £3,000,000;

and accordingly the transaction involved the community as a whole—a community which was scarcely larger than a third-rate English town—in a very serious pecuniary loss, amounting roughly to some £2,000,000. The effect of the measure was most disastrous to the frontier farmers. They depended entirely for the supply of labour necessary to their farming and stock-raising upon their slaves, and they knew well, as proved to be the case, that no coloured people would work for them except under compulsion. For these unhappy Boers, with their ignorance of all civilised appliances, and their consequent incapacity to adapt themselves to the new industrial conditions forced upon them by the emancipation of their slaves, only one remedy was left. They must remove themselves from contact with a social system whose principles they could not understand, and from legal restrictions in the treatment of the natives which from the first had been intolerably galling to them, but which now threatened to rob them of their sole means of subsistence. They, therefore, resolved to cross the frontier, and emigrate with their flocks and herds into the interior. The fact was that the rural Dutch retained the sentiments, and desired to practise the institutions, of the eighteenth century, while the English administration was more and more influenced by the widening

humanity of the nineteenth. At the same time, the sordid conditions of their daily life, and their illiterateness and consequent isolation from European thought, absolutely closed their minds against any appeal based upon moral progress or industrial advance. The subsequent relations of the emigrant farmers with the British Government, and the constitutions adopted by the Boer Republics, show that the refusal of the eastern Boers to submit to this measure was based upon something deeper than any mere aversion to an alien Government. What these Eastern farmers fled from was not subjection to the English Government, but subjection to the moral ideas of that European civilization from which they had been cut off for over a century.

The execution of their design was simplified by the manner of life which they had adopted, and by certain movements which had lately taken place among the Bantu tribes.

At the beginning of the century, the country beyond the Orange River, to the north-east of the Cape Colony, came to be occupied by a race of mixed European and Hottentot descent, called the Griquas. With these people the eastern Boers established friendly relations, and finding that this district was better supplied with rain than their own lands in the colony, they made a practice of taking their cattle and sheep to graze there at certain

periods of the year. In this way they had become to some extent familiar with the country between the Orange and the Vaal rivers, and with its inhabitants. Moreover, between the years 1812 and 1828 a series of murderous wars had been carried on by Tshaka, the Zulu king, and by Moselekatze, a revolted general and chief of the Matabele Zulus. Of these, Tshaka was the grandfather of Ketshwayo, while Moselekatze was destined to stand in the same relationship to Lobengula—names alike memorable in South African history. The result of these wars—which were wars not of conquest, but of *extermination*—was that the Bantu population both east and west of the Drakensberg range was at this time largely reduced,* while much of what afterwards became the Transvaal, the Free State, and Natal, was left practically unoccupied by native races.

At the same time the discontented farmers were spurred into decisive action by an unfortunate interference on the part of the Home Authorities in the frontier policy of the Colonial Government.

In 1834, Sir Benjamin Durban became Governor in succession to Sir Lowry Cole. He was instructed to carry out the provisions of the Abolition Act, to effect certain reforms

* It is estimated that Tshaka caused the death of a million persons, devastating thousands of square miles of territory in the process.

and economies in the administration, and to take measures for protecting the eastern colonists from Kafir inroads. On his arrival at the Cape he found that this latter question claimed his immediate attention. The frontier was in a disturbed state; but there was a difference of opinion as to the actual intentions of the Kafir chiefs. The colonial officials took a very grave view of the position, but the missionary party at Capetown, led by Dr. Philip, asserted that the alarm of the colonists was unfounded, and that the chiefs intended to be loyal to their engagements with the Government. Unhappily, Dr. Philip proved to have been mistaken. On the 23rd December, ten thousand Kafirs swept over the frontier. The invasion was so sudden that although every available soldier was hurried to the front, and the burgher forces were promptly called out, fifty Europeans were surprised and murdered within the first week. The total losses sustained by the English and Dutch settlers were subsequently returned as consisting of: 456 farm-houses burnt and entirely destroyed; 350 partially destroyed; 60 waggons, 5,715 horses, 111,930 horned cattle, and 161,930 sheep, captured and irrecoverably lost.

When at length the colony had been cleared of the Kafir invaders, Sir Benjamin Durban took certain measures to secure the settlers

against future loss of life and property. In brief, he wished to create a strategic frontier strong enough to withstand the pressure of the Bantu masses. The boundary of the colony was to be advanced from the Keiskamma to the Kei river; European settlers were to be established between the Fish and the Keiskamma, and beyond them, a body of loyal Kafirs, supported by a line of forts, were to be located between the Keiskamma and the Kei. This policy was afterwards admitted to have been right. Sir George Napier, who succeeded Sir Benjamin Durban, subsequently said, in examination before the House of Commons: "My own experience and what I saw with my own eyes have confirmed me that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin Durban was perfectly right." But unfortunately, at this time of all others, when the Dutch farmers were seething with discontent, the Home Government chose to reverse Durban's policy, and ordered the country between the Fish and Kei rivers to be restored to the Kafirs. The despatch which contained this decision was written on December 26th, 1835, by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg), who then performed the duties afterwards assigned to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.* He

* The Colonial Office was not constituted in its present form until 1854, when, in pursuance of Lord Grey's new colonial policy (of self-government), a principal Secretary of State was appointed solely for the colonial department.

maintained that the Kafirs were justified in what they had done; that, in fact, their invasion was the natural result of the oppressions to which they had been subjected by the colonists, and that they had been wrongfully deprived of their territory. This theory was contrary to all colonial opinion, except that of the missionary party; and the action of the Home Government produced a feeling of indignation in which the English settlers were as keenly moved as the Dutch.

This unfortunate interference confirmed the eastern Boers in their intention to withdraw from the colony. And between the years 1835-1838, it was estimated that ten thousand persons of Franco-Dutch origin emigrated into the interior. For this emigration their previous life had well prepared them. Their canvas-covered waggons afforded them all the accommodation they required for their scanty household possessions, and for their own protection from the elements. They set out in the true nomad spirit. Their flocks and their herds were around them, and before them was the prospect of unbounded pastures, where their cattle could be herded by docile natives; and where, if they so chose, they could establish patriarchal communities and continue to live as their fathers had lived before them.

CHAPTER IX.

THE KAFIR WARS (1833—1853).

THE formal separation of the Dutch and English—what Sir George Grey called the "dismemberment" of South Africa—did not take place until twenty years after the "great trek" began. Then, by the Sand River Convention (1852), and the Bloemfontein Convention (1854), the British Government for the first time recognized the existence of the communities established by the emigrant Boers beyond the Vaal and in the Orange River district. Both Republics thus created were inland states; but the Boer settlements in Natal, a maritime province on the east coast, were retained under British authority, and subsequently formed a large element in the European population of the colony so called. During their wanderings and migrations the Boers were involved in more than one desperate struggle with the Matabele and the Zulus, while at the same

time they repeatedly found themselves in conflict with the British Government. A brief account of the essential facts which governed their varying relationships to England, and their dealings with the Bantu tribes, is reserved for a subsequent chapter.

During the same period, British soldiers were continuously employed in guarding the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony against Kafir inroads, and in periodic expeditions, more or less fatal and protracted, against rebellious Kafir chiefs. It must be remembered that in South Africa the dark-skinned races are, to this day, many times as numerous as the Europeans; and that the military tribes, before they were brought under European control, were constantly practising the art of war among themselves, and ever ready to combine and overwhelm the European settlers. They were dangerous neighbours at all times; but now they had been rendered more disturbed, and consequently more dangerous, by the appearance of the emigrant Boers in their midst.

At this time South Africa was characterized for Englishmen by the Kafir wars. They were necessary for the preservation of the English settlers who had been sent out under the protection of the English people, and almost the entire cost and burden of the military operations involved in this duty was

of necessity borne by the English taxpayers. At the same time, it was not surprising that at the end of the period the English people grew impatient at the repeated losses of men and money, and came to regard the Cape Colony as a possession of doubtful value.

After the Kafir invasion of 1834-5, the eastern border was placed under the control of a Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Stokenstrom; and, in pursuance of the policy laid down by Lord Glenelg, the independence of the Kafirs beyond the Fish River was recognized. Alliances were made with the powerful chiefs, who were furnished with British Residents; and these chiefs were made responsible for the depredations committed by the people under their authority. The same system was also applied to the native races on the north-eastern border. By these means peace was maintained until the end of 1846, when Sandilli, the young chief who had succeeded to Gaika's position as chief of the Kosas, became insubordinate, and tried conclusions with the Colonial Government in the fourth Kafir war. This war was known as the "War of the Axe," from the circumstances under which it broke out. One of Sandilli's people was arrested on the charge of stealing an axe. As he was being taken from Fort Beaufort to Grahamstown for trial, he was rescued, and in the course of his rescue a barbarous murder was

committed. Sandilli refused to hand over the persons concerned to the Colonial Government, and his defiance led to a declaration of war. Peace was made at the end of 1848, on the submission of Sandilli's people. But in 1851 the war was renewed over an extended area, which included the mountainous country of Moshesh, the astute old chief of the Basutos; and the pacification of the tribes on the north-eastern borders of the colony was not effected until a force of 2,000 British troops had been brought against them by Sir George Cathcart in 1853. As a result of these operations, the Kafirs on the borders of the colony were taken permanently under direct British control, and the province so constituted received the name of "Kaffraria."

Now, the Kafirs were by no means an inconsiderable foe; and in the conduct of these wars, those small disasters which are inseparable from the economic employment of inadequate military resources were frequently incurred by the British soldiers. At the same time, they were marked by the acts of heroism — individual and collective — which are, happily, no less characteristic of our "little wars." One incident is conspicuous. On February 26th, 1852, when the transport "Birkenhead" was wrecked off Danger Point, 400 British soldiers stood to their ranks on the deck of the sinking ship, and, rather than

endanger the safety of the women and children in the boats, thus met their death. But, without attempting to enter into such details, it is necessary to gain some general idea of the nature of Kafir warfare, and of the sufferings of the settlers; otherwise we can scarcely understand the feelings of the South African colonists towards the Bantu—feelings which are very different from those of stay-at-home Englishmen.

The South African Bantu are roughly divided into military and industrial tribes. The former, who naturally have possessed themselves of the most fertile regions, are to be found chiefly between the Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean, and in the south-east coast regions. The latter were driven to find homes on the high plateau westward of the great mountain ranges, or northward in the still less inviting desert regions. The military Bantu, such people as the Zulus, the Matabele Zulus, and the various Kafir tribes, give their whole life to war. Their "town" is built in the form of a fortress, with the cattle pen, containing their sole wealth, surrounded by a ring of huts; their chief is absolute, and their young men are all "warriors." They grow very little Kafir corn, for they depend for their subsistence upon the herds of cattle which they capture. The industrial Bantu, on the other hand—

peaceful people such as the Mashonas, the Bechuanas, and the Basutos—live in open "towns," cultivate the fields in their neighbourhood, and even practise some of the arts, weaving cotton and working iron. Moreover, the power of their chiefs is limited by the rights of the lesser chiefs, and by those of the commoners of the tribe. There is a significant difference in the manner in which they use their common weapon, the assegai. The peaceful tribes *throw* it from them as a javelin; the warlike tribes use it as a stabbing spear. In "Mokanna's Gathering," the prophet chief says:

> Fling your broad shields away—
> Bootless against such foes;
> But hand to hand we'll fight to-day,
> And with their bayonets close.
>
> Grasp each man short his stabbing spear—
> And when to battle's edge we come,
> Rush on their ranks in full career
> And to their hearts strike home.

Each of the military tribes formed, in a natural state, an army of cruel and well-disciplined warriors. But the Kafirs had at this time gained experience by contact with civilized forces. An illustration of this is afforded by an incident in the "War of the Axe." On one occasion they attacked a company of British soldiers, who fought behind the earthen entrenchments of Fort Peddie, supported by a force of Fingoes. The scene was described by an "eye-witness" in a

frontier paper; and the description has been preserved in Mrs. Harriet Ward's "Five Years in Kaffirland":

"Were it not that life and death were concerned in [the attack], I should have pronounced it a most beautiful sight. The Kafir commanders sent their aides-de-camp from one party to another, just as you would see it done on a field-day with European troops. The main bodies were continually increasing with horse and footmen, and soon after eleven the array was truly terrific. The largest body was to the westward; finding their scheme of drawing the troops out did not succeed, small parties advanced in skirmishing order, and then the two divisions of Pato and the Gaikas moved towards each other, as if intending a combined attack on some given point. Colonel Lindsay was superintending the working of the gun himself, and, as soon as a body of Gaikas came within range, a shot was sent into the midst of them..... The Kafirs now extended themselves in a line six miles in length. These advancing at the same time so filled the valley that it seemed a mass of moving Kafirs; rockets and shells were poured rapidly on them, and presently a tremendous fire of musketry was poured over our heads."

But the persons who suffered most were the isolated frontier settlers. Even when they received warning in time to make their escape

to the nearest town, they sacrificed their dwellings and their cattle. In the course of a ride on the western side of Grahamstown, in the year 1847, Mrs. Ward came upon many such ruined homesteads. The scene at one of these she describes :

"The settlers, a man and his wife, perfectly English in appearance, but pale and harassed, stood surveying their miserable homestead. This, too, from its open position, had escaped the band; but the windows were shattered, the door swung on imperfect hinges, the steps were broken, and the grass grew between them; the little garden was laid waste . . . . . and a few poor articles of furniture which had been borne away to Grahamstown, on the family flitting, stood in the open air, awaiting more strength than the exhausted mistress of the place could command.

"We asked them if they, too, had lost their cattle? The man smiled as he said 'Yes'—he seemed amused . . . . . The woman sighed, and answered that two of her herds had been killed, and her son had had a narrow escape of being shot. 'We did not like to stay after that, ma'am,' said she; 'and we have been many months in Grahamstown. I'm sure I don't think we are safe now, in spite of all the fresh soldiers we've got in the country.'"

Sandilli, whose ambition, together with his folly in listening to the young warriors of his

court, had caused all this misery—was brought into Grahamstown on Sunday, October 25th, 1847.

"Closely guarded by a body of Cape Mounted Riflemen and 7th Dragoon Guards, under Captain Basset and Lieutenant Petre, and attended by the Councillors and his own brother, Auta (a young man of great talents and energy, and his chief warrior,) he rode through the streets just as the church doors opened to send forth the Christian observers of the Sabbath. Bare-headed, and with downcast eyes, his withered limb hanging below his kaross, marking him as the restless Gaika—he who had issued his word from the mountain side over his widespread and beautiful territory, now passed as a prisoner, followed by a few Hottentot boys!

"How little could that wild creature comprehend the feelings of white men as they watched him on his way . . . . . The cavalcade moved slowly through the streets, the Drostdy barrack-ground is reached, the soldiers on guard at last behold the man whom they have so long sought . . . . . The shape and aspect of his prison must offer a wretched contrast to the broad valleys and free mountain paths which the ill-advised and misguided lord of the Amakosas has forfeited."

CHAPTER X.

THE BOER EMIGRANTS.

ONE event which arose directly out of the impatience of England at the burden of these long-protracted Kafir wars was the formal recognition of the independence of the disaffected Dutch colonists. The separation of the Europeans in South Africa which was thus effected was very disastrous to the common interests of the colonists of both nationalities; and, from an Imperial point of view, it constitutes the gravest administrative failure committed by any English Government since the loss of the United States in 1783.

It has been already noted that this event, representing the loss of part of the European population originally transferred by Holland to England in 1814, did not take place until twenty years after the emigration commenced. During this twenty years the emigrant Boers experienced a series of very extraordinary

vicissitudes in their relations both to the natives and to the English Government.

At first the Colonial Government had some thoughts of restraining the exodus, but they were advised by the attorney-general that there was no law to prevent any of the King's subjects from leaving his dominions. The first party of emigrants met with a most disastrous fate. They made their way northward to the Limpopo, where they encountered such hardships that only a few survivors got through to the coast at Delagoa Bay. In 1836, a company of 200 persons, under Hendrik Potgieter, crossed the Orange River, and reached Thaba 'Nchu, the "town" of the Barolong chief Moroko. They were followed by more numerous companies from Graaf-Reinet, Uitenhage, and Albany, under Gert Maritz, Jacobus Uys, and other leaders. The first company, upon receiving these reinforcements, advanced further northwards, and here they encountered the Matabele Zulus under Moselekatze. Twenty-five men and women were murdered; but the rest of the emigrants "laagered" their waggons, and thus protected held out until their messengers had reached Moroko. By means of the assistance which the chief obtained for them, they were enabled to retire to Thaba 'Nchu. Moselekatze was subsequently defeated in two separate engagements by the emigrant Boers; first by a

commando under Maritz, which recovered the waggons and the cattle previously abandoned, and afterwards (in 1838) by Hendrik Potgieter and a force of Barolongs. This latter defeat was so decisive that Moselekatze fled with his Matabele warriors northward of the Limpopo to the district now called Matabeleland. It was by virtue of this defeat that the Transvaal Government afterwards claimed sovereignty over the Bechuanas—a claim which omitted to take account of the fact that they actually fought in alliance with the Barolongs, a Bechuana people.

Meanwhile the emigrants had been strengthened by fresh accessions under Pieter Retief, a man of higher station than any of the previous leaders. Upon Retief's arrival (in 1837), the emigrants organized themselves under a republican constitution at Winberg (the place of victory), and elected him commandant-general of their fighting men. Early in 1838 the more enterprizing of the emigrants, being disappointed at the character of the country between the Orange and Vaal rivers, crossed the Drakensberg mountains and took possession of Natal. They had previously obtained the consent of Dingan, the Zulu king, who promised to cede the territory to them. Early in January, Retief and a party of seventy Boers, with thirty natives, proceeded to Dingan's capital to receive from

him a deed of cession, which had been drawn up by a missionary named Owen. On February 4th, the day fixed for the conclusion of this ceremony, Retief and the whole party were murdered under circumstances of the grossest treachery; and the encampment of the emigrants on the Blue Krantz River was attacked by Dingan's army. Here, men, women, and children were ruthlessly butchered by the Zulu warriors; and only a few parties, who received warning in time to "laager" their waggons, survived. The scene of this massacre was afterwards appropriately named Weenen (the place of weeping). During that year a series of desperate engagements were fought between the emigrant farmers and the Zulus. At length, a force of 400 Boers from the Orange River, under Andries Pretorius, defeated Dingan's army, on December 16th—henceforward kept as "Dingan's Day." The Boers, who fought in an entrenched camp, lost only three or four men. On the other hand, three thousand Zulus were killed by these intrepid marksmen. Dingan retreated with his disordered host to his "chief kraal," and, having set fire to it, fled in terror to the northwards. Pretorius then advanced, and recovered from the smoking ruins of Dingan's town both Retief's skull and the deed of cession with Dingan's mark duly affixed to it.

In that same year, Durban was occupied by a small British force, in pursuance of a proclamation issued by the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir George Napier. This was the first interference of the British Government with the emigrant Boers, and the terms in which its object was stated are significant. It was "to put an end to the unwarranted occupation of the territories belonging to the natives by certain emigrants from the Cape Colony, being subjects of Her Majesty." When, however, the Boers withdrew from the port into the interior of Natal, no steps were taken to further interfere with their movements, and in the year 1839 they founded the town of Pieter-Maritzburg, the present capital of Natal. Early in January of the next year, the Boers under Pretorius, in alliance with the forces of Panda, Dingan's brother, again defeated Dingan, who after this reverse fled from the country and soon afterwards met his death. Pretorius, as a result of this decisive victory, issued a proclamation on February 14th, 1840, in which he described himself as the "Commandant-General of the Right Worshipful Volksraad of the South African Society of Port Natal," and forthwith declared Panda to be King of the Zulus in the place of Dingan, and claimed possession of the whole of Natal on behalf of the Volksraad.

Meanwhile, the British soldiers were withdrawn, and, although Sir George Napier repeatedly refused to recognize the existence of the authority thus constituted, saying that "Her Majesty could not acknowledge the independence of her own subjects," yet the Boers were in other respects left to their own devices until they compelled the Government to interfere by an act of great barbarity. This was the raid made by Pretorius upon a native chief, called N'Capai, when, in addition to other acts of violence, seventeen young children were carried off as slaves to the Boers. After this affair, Sir George Napier sent a British force to the Umgazi River to prevent the repetition of such dangerous and barbarous practices; and ultimately, in May, 1843, a British Administration was established in Natal. The Government thus introduced was framed upon instructions issued by Lord Derby (then Lord Stanley). The Commissioner, Mr. Cloete, was directed to call the Boers together on his arrival, and give them an opportunity of stating the character of the institutions which they desired. It was not proposed to confer legislative authority upon the community in the first instance. No distinction or disqualification based upon "colour, origin, language, or creed," was to be recognised; no "aggression upon natives beyond the Colony" was to be allowed;

and slavery, in any shape or form, was declared to be "absolutely unlawful." But, subject to these restrictions, the Boers were to choose for themselves. The spirit of the whole despatch appears in the following lines :

"I think it probable, looking to the nature of the population, that they will desire these institutions to be founded on the Dutch rather than on the English model, and, however little some of these institutions may be suited to a more advanced state of civilization, it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that in this respect the contentment of the emigrants, rather than the abstract merits of the institutions, should guide our decision."

In other words, the British Government, in re-imposing their jurisdiction on the Boers in Natal, decided to avoid the mistake which had been made in the Cape Colony. They made no second attempt to force English institutions upon an alien people, but they did insist upon the observance of certain fundamental principles of morality. But here, again, the fatal deterioration of the Boer character, and their ignorance of industrial methods, prevented the success of these equitable intentions. Not only was a very large area of land necessary for the support of a Boer family, but the compulsory service of the natives, for the tending of the cattle and sheep, and for the cultivation of the soil, was

also regarded by them as indispensable. By right of their conquest of Dingan the Boers claimed the whole of the soil of Natal; and when the Land Courts established by the English Administration refused to recognise their claim, and apportioned part of the country to the natives, they were dissatisfied. And on these grounds a large section under Pretorius once more withdrew themselves from British authority, and established communities beyond the Vaal River.

The circumstances which led directly to the recognition of the independence of the Boers in the Transvaal, and to that of the earlier settlements in the Orange River district, arose out of the "War of the Axe," and its sequel. In 1847, Sir Harry Smith, who was then Governor of the colony, proclaimed British authority over the Boer communities between the Orange River and the Vaal, naming the territory the Orange River Sovereignty. But after he had established an administration and withdrawn his forces, the Boers within the Sovereignty revolted. They were assisted by a force from beyond the Vaal, led by Pretorius. The united Boer levies were defeated by Sir Harry Smith at Boomplaats, on August 28th, 1848. Pretorius retired across the Vaal, and was declared an outlaw; and the Sovereignty Government was reconstituted. But in 1851, when the whole of

the British forces in South Africa were occupied in holding the eastern frontier against the Kafirs, Pretorius, seizing his opportunity, informed Major Warden, the officer in command of the Sovereignty, that unless the British Government would recognize the independence of the Boers beyond the Vaal, he would cause an insurrection in the Sovereignty. Sir Harry Smith was unable to spare a single soldier to support Major Warden, and in this way the Transvaal Boers extorted the recognition of their independence embodied in the Sand River Convention of January 17th, 1852. In 1853, Sir George Cathcart (who had succeeded Sir Harry Smith) was compelled to employ a large British force to reduce the Basutos, who had committed depredations upon the lands of the Sovereignty; and as a result of his experience he reported to the English Government that a permanent force of 2,000 men would be necessary to hold the country against both the Boers and the Basutos. As the Home Government refused to incur such large responsibilities in addition to the defence of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony against the Kafirs, it was determined to abandon the Sovereignty; and in order to effect this object the independence of the Boers between the Orange and the Vaal Rivers was restored under the terms of the Convention of Bloemfontein, on February 23rd, 1854.

In this way the two Dutch Republics—the South African Republic in the Transvaal, and the Orange River Free State—came into existence. It was a grave disaster, for the differences of character and institutions which already divided the two European nationalities were intensified and rendered permanent by the separate political existence thus conferred upon the more backward section of the Franco-Dutch settlers.

CHAPTER XI.

THE NON-INTERVENTION POLICY (1854—1871).

WHEN the Imperial* Government determined to recognize the independence of the emigrant Boers, they had also decided to grant a representative legislature to the Cape Colony. Both of these measures were steps towards the attainment of a single object. During the next fifteen years it was the purpose of the newly-organized Colonial Office to confine the responsibilities of England as much as possible in South Africa; and the policy which was pursued during this period is correctly indicated by the term "non-intervention."

On this basis, the Boer communities were

* I use the term "Imperial" for the first time advisedly, for it was only after the organization of the Colonial Office under a Secretary of State for the Colonies, consequent upon the new Colonial policy of self-government introduced by Lord Grey, that the British Government assumed the relationship towards the Colonies properly described by the term "Imperial," *i.e.*, that of a chief Government controlling lesser Governments.

left to organize their Governments on their own lines; British interference between them and the natives was reduced to a minimum; the task of controlling the native population outside the limits of the three British possessions—the Cape Colony, Natal, and British Kaffraria—was abandoned; and, at the same time, the Cape Colonists were encouraged to take a more active part in the settlement of the difficulties with the Kafirs on their eastern frontier.

Looking back now, with the subsequent course of South African history before us, we see that this policy of non-intervention was a mistake. Read by the "fierce light" of Isandlhwana and Majuba Hill, it shows only as an attempt to evade the responsibilities which properly belonged to England, as the Sovereign Power in South Africa—the Power whose duty it was, both to guide the development of European colonization and to control the disintegration and subsequent re-organization of the native tribes. If we endeavour to apportion the blame, to determine who is rightly to be charged with the fault, we are compelled to adopt the conclusion that neither the nation, nor the Imperial Government as a whole, can be blamed, but that the fault lies with the officials of the Colonial Office, who persistently disregarded the advice of their local representative, and studiously minimized,

and even suppressed, information without which it was impossible for the nation to form correct opinions.

In so far as any one cause can be assigned for the disasters to the British arms and the administrative failures which have characterized our rule in South Africa, it is this: the refusal of the "man in Downing Street"—the Secretary of State for the



South Africa in 1854.

Colonies—to listen to the "man on the spot," Governor, High Commissioner, or Special Commissioner, as the case may be. From an Imperial point of view, the worst feature of the whole miserable story of perpetual conflict revealed by the Blue Books is the fact that more than once the credit of a Colonial Secretary, or of a Cabinet, has been

saved at the expense of the reputation—perhaps, even the life—of the local administrator who has been most faithful to his trust.

At this time, the "man on the spot"—Sir George Grey (1854—1862)—was both a strong man and a far-seeing man. He foresaw that the military Bantu, if left to themselves, would wax powerful, and one day unite to contest the supremacy of race with the Europeans. He foresaw, too, that the stubborn Boer would, if occasion arose, defy the Imperial Government, and appeal to his kinsmen in the Cape Colony on the score of blood; and that the nationality difficulty, instead of being overcome, would be increased by the process which he called the "dismemberment" of European South Africa. But Sir George Grey's warnings and proposals were alike disregarded. For the steps which he took to re-unite the Boer Republics with the Cape Colony by means of a federal tie, he was charged with "disobedience," and recalled. And, although he was subsequently re-appointed, he was strictly enjoined to keep within the Non-Intervention programme. His proposals for establishing British Residents among the Zulus were rejected; and even the measures which he took for securing the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, and for introducing civilization among the Kafirs, were regarded with suspicion. These measures

included the establishment of a body of German settlers in British Kaffraria. As many of the men were soldiers of the German Legion who had served in the Crimea, this settlement formed a valuable contribution to the resources available for the defence of the frontier and the maintenance of British rule in Kaffraria. Nevertheless, both in this matter and in his plans for establishing European officials and educational and industrial institutions among the Kafirs, he was thwarted and censured.

On the 8th of September, 1858, he wrote: "I would now only urge upon H.M. Government that they should not distress me more than is absolutely necessary regarding the few thousand pounds which may be necessary for the government and control of the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country, as I am, of troops, some great disaster will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off from me. I am sure that, if the enormous reductions I have effected in military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of the country has been advantageously laid out. I may, with so weak a force at disposal, be compelled to incur some expenditure for the control of the native populations; but you

may depend that not the slightest unnecessary expense shall be incurred."

The event to which allusion is made here—the despatch of troops to India from the Cape—is remarkable as an instance of a daring and justifiable assumption of authority, and at the same time it serves to remind us that communication between England and India was at this time maintained by the long sea route which passes the Cape of Good Hope. In August, 1857, after the news of the Indian Mutiny had reached the Cape, Sir George Grey on his own responsibility ordered some transports, which were returning with troops on board from China, to sail to India. At the same time, he despatched as many men as could be spared from the Cape garrison. The troops which thus arrived were the first reinforcements received by the Indian Government, and their arrival enabled Sir Colin Campbell to relieve Lucknow. By this action, Sir George Grey, in the words of Lord Malmesbury, "probably saved India."

In thus "stripping the country" of British soldiers Sir George Grey made an appeal to the Kafir chiefs which shows how great an influence he had obtained over them. Before sending the troops off, he visited the chiefs and, telling them that the Queen required the services of her soldiers in India, asked them

to pledge themselves not to cause any trouble. The Kafir chiefs on the frontier gave the required pledges, and kept their word. There was, however, a limit to Sir George Grey's authority with these people. When on one occasion he had remonstrated on the subject of their women wearing anklets, one of the chiefs replied: "Rest content, O Great Chief, with what you have accomplished. You have made us pay taxes. You have made our people work. These things, we thought, could never be. But think not that you can stop women wearing ornaments. If you try to do this, O Governor, you will most surely fail."

But Sir George Grey's usefulness, even in respect of the more humane and effective treatment of the Kafirs, was checked by the interference of the Colonial Office. On July 20th, 1859, he writes, in reply to the despatch which re-called* him: "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of policy as H.M. Government hold, I can only make the general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department, each of whom held different views upon some

* He was subsequently re-appointed (as before stated).

important points of policy connected with this country."

The most disastrous of these interferences was the refusal to allow him to "federate the several provinces" of South Africa, and to adopt the Orange River Free State into this federation. As it was, the emigrant Boers, the Cape Colony, and Natal, each proceeded to develop upon different lines, and to acquire separate interests. In particular the original divergences between the Dutch and English colonists were perpetuated and exaggerated.

The constitutions which the Boer States adopted are not merely republican in form—that in itself would make them differ but slightly from the constitutions of the British Colonies—but they combine with their republicanism certain principles peculiar to the Boers, and suitable only for very primitive societies. These principles, which underlie the Boer economy, are (1) the refusal to recognize any equality between the natives and the Europeans, and (2) the close connection of citizen rights with military service, or the "commando" system. Under the former, the coloured people in the Boer states are only partially admitted to civil rights, and entirely excluded from political rights; under the latter, all adult males among the "burghers," or citizens, are liable for military service in

time of war, while in time of peace they are compelled to undergo a burdensome routine of constant drills. To make the acquisition of political rights thus dependent upon submission to an onerous system of military service is, in itself, sufficient to exclude a purely industrial population from participation in the work of government. But in the South African Republic at the present time even this original barrier has been built higher by legislation which practically prevents the Outlander, or non-burgher, from acquiring the franchise under any circumstances whatever. The constitutions of the Boer Republics are thus really oligarchical; that is to say, the right of taking part in the government is closely confined to one class, the burghers or native-born citizens. These alone elect the President, the Executive Council, and the members of the Volksraad, or Representative Assembly, and to these three authorities the work of administration and of legislation is entrusted. It is scarcely necessary to point out that, for a country like the Transvaal, which afterwards became the scene of a great industrial development—due mainly to immigration—no conceivable form of government could be more unsuitable.

Since a new relationship between the Boers and the Imperial Government was created by the establishment of these Republics, it will be

convenient to state briefly the nature of any subsequent interferences which have taken place. The principle which has guided the Imperial Government in these interferences with the independence of the Boers is stated in a despatch* of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach. In it he writes: "Neither by the Sand River Convention of 1852, nor at any other time, did H.M. Government surrender the right and duty of requiring that the Transvaal should be governed with a view to the common safety of the various European communities." These interferences, therefore, have been undertaken only when the common interests, or the common safety, of the Europeans in South Africa seemed to be at stake. Thus, in 1868, the Imperial Government interfered between the Basutos and the Free State Government. The latter, having with difficulty reduced Moshesh, the Basuto chief, to submission, proposed to confiscate the most valuable portion of his territory. This punishment would have had the effect of causing the Basutos to disperse in search of fresh territory—a proceeding eminently dangerous to the peace of South Africa. Under these circumstances the prayer of Moshesh, "Let me and my people rest and live under the large folds of the flag of England ere I am no more," was heard. The Basutos

* To Lord (then Sir Garnet) Wolseley, Nov. 20th, 1879.

were taken under British protection, and an equitable boundary was fixed between them and the Free State by the Convention of Aliwal North (1869). By an application of the same principle we shall find the Imperial Government assuming the administration of the Diamond Fields in 1871, annexing the Transvaal in 1877, establishing a British protectorate in Bechuanaland in 1884-5, and to-day endeavouring to obtain political and economic reforms from the Government of the South African Republic.

Meanwhile—that is to say, while the Boer emigrants were organizing themselves in their primitive republics—the population and commerce of the Cape Colony was expanding; and this expansion was accompanied by gradual constitutional changes which terminated in the full political freedom of self-government. The wool industry, which was founded under circumstances which have been previously mentioned, developed especially in the eastern provinces with the expansion of the English population. Here, too, in the Albany district, the ostrich industry was permanently established in 1869 by Mr. Arthur Douglass's discovery of an artificial incubator, by means of which the farmer was enabled to domesticate these naturally savage birds. In 1856, Mr. Adolph Mosenthal succeeded in introducing Angora

goats from Asia Minor, and thus another source of wealth was provided in the mohair industry. Copper mining, the first of the mineral industries of South Africa, was commenced in the north-west corner of the Cape Colony in 1852. At the same time, an admirable system of roads had been designed and executed under Mr. John Montagu, the then Colonial Secretary, in 1844; while in 1859, Sir George Grey had turned the first sod of the Capetown and Wellington railway. Here were signs of progress—slow, perhaps, but real enough to justify Sir George Grey's statement "that, in point of fact, H.M. possessions in South Africa were of great, and yearly increasing, value to the trade and commerce of Great Britain . . . . . ; that the people did not desire Kafir wars; that they were fully aware of the much greater advantages they derived from the peaceful pursuits of industry, and from cultivating their valuable exports."

Industrial expansion was accompanied by constitutional development. From the commencement of the century up to the appointment of Sir George Grey, the colony had been governed on the lines of a military administration. The power of the Governor, who was more or less despotic, was limited by a Council which consisted mainly of officials who, like himself, were accountable to the Home authorities. In 1853, however, a

Legislative Council and a House of Assembly, composed of members elected by the colonists, were created. The chief effect of the new constitution was to give the colonists an opportunity of expressing their views as to the management of their affairs. Under this system the executive power still remained with the Governor and the chief officials of the Colonial Government; and all financial measures had to be introduced into the Parliament by a member of the Executive. Moreover, the members of the Executive were appointed by the Governor, instead of being selected by the Parliamentary representatives themselves. Twenty years later, in 1872-3, "responsible" government was introduced. Under this system—the system which has now been applied to all the great colonies—the members of the Executive, or the "Government" for the time being, are chosen from among the ranks of the party which commands a majority in the House of Assembly, and they are accountable not to the Imperial Government but to the people of the colony.*

It is necessary, before concluding this chapter—a chapter in which an endeavour has been made to indicate the lines of development

* Technically they are servants of the Crown; but the Crown, of course, represents the interests of the people of that part of the Queen's dominions in which they serve.

of the three divisions into which the non-intervention policy divided the Europeans of South Africa—to say a word about the Colony of Natal. The circumstance which makes Natal differ most from the Cape Colony is the great numerical superiority of the native over the white population. In the Cape Colony it has been found possible not only to give the natives some education and industrial training, but to admit them (under certain just reservations) to full and equal political rights. In Natal, however, where the Kafirs are twelve times as numerous as the Europeans, the task of educating the natives for a partnership with the white man has been infinitely more difficult. And here, instead of breaking down the power of the chiefs, as was done under Sir George Grey's policy with the Kafirs in the Cape Colony and in Kaffraria, it has been found necessary to retain the tribal organization, and with it the authority of the chiefs, and, also, to keep the natives in general under separate and special laws.*

In addition to this, the products of Natal are semi-tropical, and the sugar and tea plantations are worked by coolies imported from India for a term of years. These two circumstances make this colony resemble India

* For example, at nine o'clock the "curfew" bell rings at Durban and Maritzburg, and it is an offence for a Kafir to be abroad in the streets after this hour.

in its conditions; but in other respects the European community, which is composed of persons of Dutch and English origin in equal proportions, has developed upon the ordinary industrial lines of a British colony.

CHAPTER XII.

THE DISCOVERY OF DIAMONDS AT KIMBERLEY.

UP to the year 1870, the progress of the Cape Colony was slow. Indeed, it was the sort of progress which is typified by the ox-waggon, the national vehicle of South Africa. But at that date an event occurred which caused the non-intervention policy to be abandoned, and gave a sudden impetus to the development of British colonization in South Africa. This was the discovery of a rich deposit of diamonds, packed away in four volcanic craters and pipes in the desert region northward of the colonial boundary, which has since become famous as the site of the town of Kimberley.

The district in which this unique discovery was made was outside the boundary of the Cape Colony; and when, therefore, in the following year, British authority was established there, and a new territory called Griqualand West was created, the proceedings

involved a departure from the policy of non-intervention outside the limits of British territory. The Imperial Government secured the Diamond Fields in the first instance by cession, or voluntary surrender, from a Griqua chief. This chief, Waterboer, alleged that the country belonged to him; but the Free State Government claimed it as part of their territory; as being, in fact, included in the boundary of the Orange River sovereignty as defined by Sir Harry Smith. It was afterwards proved that the Free State was right; and the Colonial Office subsequently recognized the mistake by paying, as compensation, a sum of £90,000, together with a further sum of £15,000 for railway construction. The district itself was not, however, restored; for it was thought that the Free State Government would not be strong enough to maintain order over the miscellaneous mining population which had quickly gathered at Kimberley. Here was another instance of an interference with the Boer Republics which, while it involved a technical injustice, was undertaken on the ground that it was required by the common interests of South Africa. For the development of the diamond mines was felt to be—and afterwards proved to be—a matter of supreme importance to the Europeans as a whole.

Although this remarkable discovery occurred

so recently, the circumstances which led up to it are not perfectly known. It appears, however, that, in the year 1867, a trader named O'Reilly was shown a stone in a farm-house in the Hopetown district of the Cape Colony. This stone turned out to be a diamond worth £500. Two years later the farmer, Van Niekerk, obtained a similar stone from a Griqua Hottentot ; and this stone also turned out to be a diamond, which was appropriately called "The Star of South Africa." After passing through various hands, it was eventually sold to the Countess of Dudley for £25,000.

The news of these "finds" soon spread ; and numbers of persons came to look for other stones like them. As these stones had been river pebbles, the searchers turned their attention to the rivers, and at first they worked their way up the Vaal. In 1870 there were 10,000 men at work at these "wet diggings," as they were called. But at the end of this year diamonds were found on two farms, Dutoitspan and Bulfontein, which were about twenty miles to the west of the "wet diggings." Next year more discoveries were made ; and diamonds were found at Old De Beers, and at the Colesberg Kopje, as the Kimberley mine was originally named.

After this the "wet diggings" were deserted, and the searchers for diamonds

hastened to these "dry diggings." Their encampments, which gradually grew into the present town of Kimberley, were pitched in the midst of a barren country, 4,000 feet above sea level. At first there were no roads, no regular food supply could be established, and the dust-storms were terribly noxious. Nevertheless, with the near prospect of finding the dull stones that turned into brilliants, they pegged out their claims, and cheerfully settled down in tents, and wooden huts with corrugated iron roofs. No one imagined in these early days that there was anything more than a haphazard collection of stones on the surface; and everyone was prepared, therefore, to move away from so dismal a place directly the supply gave out. As a matter of fact, they were only scratching the surface of the actual deposits of diamond-bearing earth, for these four Kimberley mines were absolutely unique. They were afterwards found to be the craters and pipes of four extinct volcanoes; and the "blue ground," or diamond-bearing earth, was a stream of volcanic mud, which had been forced up long ago by subterranean energy through the pipes, and which had thus filled, first them, and finally the cup-like openings to the level of the surface of the surrounding country.

For fifteen years the mines were worked by surface digging. The "blue ground" was

first dug out, and afterwards—as the level of the workings sank lower—hauled out by iron buckets running on wire cables. Then, when it had been thus carried to the edges of the mines, it was broken up, and the stones were washed out of it and picked over and sorted. In this way the "diggings" became great pits, which gradually grew deeper and deeper. This method of raising the "blue ground" was attended by two evils. The claims in the centre were flooded with water, and the claims near the edge were covered by falls of the encasing rocks, or "reef," as the miners called it. In 1883, the joint effect of these two evils had become so disastrous in the Kimberley mine, that the work had to be abandoned. The Mining Board had spent half a million of money in trying to keep the workings clear, but all to no purpose. It was recognized now that some other method must be adopted—that, in short, the "blue ground" must be won by underground workings. Accordingly, shafts were sunk outside the rims of the craters or pits, and horizontal tunnels were driven which struck the pipes which held the "blue ground." And from this time onwards the Kimberley Diamond Mines have been worked in much the same way as coal mines are worked in England.

The result of the introduction of the new system was remarkable. The De Beers mine,

where it was first introduced, doubled its output of diamonds in a single year. And the other mines were subsequently affected in the same manner. So many diamonds were now put on the market, that the price per carat fell from 27s. 3d. in 1882, to 18s. 5½d. in 1887. In fact, the industry was threatened with the danger of over-production.

From this danger of excessive competition, the diamond industry was rescued by the gradual amalgamation of the conflicting interests of the various proprietors. In the course of this process, the industry came to be practically controlled by one Company—the De Beers Consolidated Mines. This amalgamation was a process which naturally resulted from the changes in the conditions under which the industry was from time to time carried on. At the beginning, the surfaces of the respective mines were divided into claims of 31ft. square; and the more valuable of these claims were sub-divided, so that at one time a single patch of ground, 31ft. square, in Kimberley mine, belonged to 1,600 owners. As the difficulty and expense of raising the "blue ground" increased with the process of excavation, the private owners gave place to limited liability companies. But even these companies were not able to raise the "blue ground" economically. What was required for economic working was that

each mine should be under the control of one authority. In the case of the Kimberley and De Beers mines this object was practically achieved; and then, in order to avoid a disastrous struggle, these two mines were combined, and the company thus formed subsequently acquired controlling interests in the other two. This work of amalgamating the numerous and conflicting interests concerned in the diamond industry, was a difficult and delicate task. It required financial capacity of the highest order. Such a capacity was ready there in the person of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who, having left England as a delicate youth, had pegged out his claim among the earliest miners. This achievement was the first evidence which Mr. Rhodes gave of the remarkable powers which have caused his personality to dominate the conduct of affairs in South Africa for the last ten years.

To-day the De Beers Consolidated Mines practically represent the diamond industry at Kimberley. A few figures will indicate the extent and method of the industry which they control.

The open works of the four mines extend over 111¾ acres. The area of the De Beers mine at the hard rock level is ten acres, and that of the Kimberley mine is 4½ acres. The works and the mines are lighted throughout by electric light, and in the year 1890, 1,261

Europeans and 5,250 natives were employed. The former live in the village of Kenilworth; the latter are rigorously confined in "compounds," or walled enclosures, built within the Company's boundaries. In the financial year 1892-3, 3,000,000 loads of "blue ground" were raised, and from this mass of diamond-bearing earth, diamonds to the value of £3,500,000 were extracted. The cost of the various processes involved—raising the "blue ground," pulverizing it, washing it, grading the stones so obtained by machinery, and finally sorting them by hand—was calculated to be about £1,500,000.

It is part of the policy of the De Beers Mines to limit the Kimberley output of diamonds. They endeavour to regulate the supply so that, while the demand is met, the market is not over-stocked. As a result of this policy, the Kimberley output has been reduced in recent years.

The diamonds won in Kimberley, from the commencement of the industry to the present time, have probably been sold for some £70,000,000. It is interesting to consider what this money has done for South Africa.

In the first place, the establishment of so unique and valuable an industry made Englishmen take a greater interest in South Africa. The diamond discoveries were much more pleasant subjects to dwell upon than the

Kafir wars. In the next, it caused an energetic and strenuous English population to grow up in the northern deserts. The increase of trade which grew out of the needs of this population raised the revenues of the Cape Colony, and enabled the Cape Government to unite Capetown and Port Elizabeth by railway, and to extend the general system northwards towards Kimberley itself. All these are direct results. If we look at events less directly connected, we must recognize that Kimberley enterprize and Kimberley wealth have contributed largely both to the development of the gold industry at Johannesburg and to the acquisition of the great northern territories of the Chartered Company.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ATTEMPT TO RE-UNITE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES BY FEDERATION (1874—1879).

NOW that the interest of England in South Africa had been again awakened, and the Cape Colony had entered upon a period of rapid industrial development, the Imperial Government became suddenly aware of the abnormal political situation which had resulted from the separation of the Europeans. The evil effects of the non-intervention policy were only too apparent. In the first place, the Imperial Government had awkwardly tied its hands by the conventions which recognized the independence of the Boer Republics. The extension of British authority in Griqualand West brought the Colonial Office into conflict with the Governments of both the Transvaal and the Free State.

The dispute with the Free State has been already related. The Transvaal Government maintained that this extension of British authority was a breach of the Sand River

Convention, under which the British Government had "disclaimed all alliances" with the coloured tribes northward of the Vaal River. They even advanced—on more than one occasion—the unwarrantable claim that the effect of this clause was to place the whole interior northward of the line of the Orange and Vaal Rivers under their jurisdiction.

Here was one evil which threatened to seriously hamper the future development of British colonization in South Africa. Another evil, no less grave, was the unsatisfactory, and even dangerous, character of the relationships which had grown up between the Europeans and the natives. The chief object of the non-intervention policy was to relieve the British Government of the responsibility of controlling the Bantu population outside of the British possessions. Accordingly, at this period, while a part of that population was subjected to the control of the several Colonies and Republics, the more strenuous military tribes were independent in their own territories. The interests of the Europeans, as a whole, obviously required that a common policy should be pursued towards the independent tribes, and that common methods should be adopted for the treatment of the native populations under the control of the several Governments. As it was, the natives were treated differently in Natal, in the

Republics, and in the Cape Colony; and when differences arose between any one of these Governments and the independent tribes on its borders, the Colonial Governments and the Boer Republics settled their differences independently, and without reference to the interests of their European neighbours.*

An example of the necessity for a common system in the treatment of the natives who were living under European government arose out of the development of the diamond industry at Kimberley. The rough work of extracting the diamonds was done by native labour. The Kafirs, attracted by the prospect of what seemed to them to be ample wages, came from all parts of South Africa. They generally stayed at the mines for short periods only, and then returned to their homes, where they bought both wives and cows—the Kafirs' two most valuable possessions—with the proceeds of their labour. Among these Kafir labourers were some Hlubis, who came from the western districts of Natal. Under the administration of Griqualand West, the natives were allowed to purchase firearms. The Hlubis availed themselves of this permission, and carried

* When, however, as in the case of the Basuto War, an imminent danger was created by their isolated action, the Imperial Government stepped in.

back their guns with them to Natal. Now, in Natal, where a very small body of Europeans were living among dense masses of Bantu, the possession of firearms by the natives was necessarily limited by stringent regulations. Eventually the Hlubis were induced to surrender or register their arms, but the attainment of this object caused a collision between the tribe and the Natal Government, and gave rise to a grave feeling of alarm among the colonists.

The general effect produced upon the natives by the isolated action of the separate European communities was precisely that which Sir George Grey anticipated. The military Bantu, seeing that the Europeans were separated, and, as they thought, weaker than before, while they themselves had grown stronger and more numerous, were emboldened, and resolved to combine and dispute the control of the country with them. Of these military tribes, the Zulus were the most powerful, and the growth of their power was perhaps the most fatal result of the non-intervention policy. It was a result which Sir George Grey had foreseen, and proposed to remedy. He advised that their development should be controlled by placing European Residents among them. As it was, Ketshwayo was allowed to turn the whole energies of this people into one channel—military training—and in this way he had converted the

tribe into a vast man-slaying machine. His original quarrel was with the Transvaal Government. He asserted that the Boers had encroached upon his western border; and, under the existing system of separate states, the development of the Zulu power was a matter for the Transvaal Government only. Consequently the British Government did not concern themselves in the matter until the menace to the Transvaal had become a menace to Natal, and through Natal to the Europeans in general. When affairs had reached this stage, the task of breaking-up Ketshwayo's formidable military system was performed solely by the Imperial Government, without any assistance from the Republics.

The remedy for these evils which Lord Carnarvon (who became Secretary for the Colonies in 1874) proposed, was Sir G. Grey's remedy of twenty years before—federation. The essence of this system of political union is the division of the work of administration and legislation into two parts—that which concerns the union as a whole, and that which solely concerns one or other of the several states. The former, the common interests, are entrusted to a federal or central legislature; the latter, the individual interests, are left under the control of the local legislatures of the separate states. There can be no question that this system was, and is, the

best method for uniting the colonies and states of South Africa. Moreover, the federal system had recently been applied (1867) with marked success to the colonies of British North America, where political union was also complicated by the division of the Europeans into two nationalities.

But the difficulties of introducing the system were far greater now than they would have been at the time when Sir George Grey was Governor. As we have seen, Natal, the Boer Republics, and the Cape Colony, had each developed on separate lines for twenty years; and the divergences which they originally exhibited, whether due to differences in the character of the people, or to differences of political or physical conditions, had been intensified and confirmed.

The first step which Lord Carnarvon took was to suggest that the Government of the Cape Colony—the first "responsible" Government, of which Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Molteno was premier—should invite representatives from Natal, and the two Republics, to take part in a Federation Conference. At the same time he nominated Mr. J. A. Froude as his own representative, and despatched him on a special mission to South Africa. Mr. Molteno's Government did not, however, see their way to carry out this proposal, and the matter fell into abeyance. After this

failure to secure the federal union of the colonies and states by local initiative, a second South Africa bill was passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1877, and at the same time Sir Bartle Frere was appointed Governor of the Cape Colony, and High Commissioner in South Africa.

The proposals embodied in the bill for "enabling the union of South African colonies and states" were eminently just and reasonable. Sir Bartle Frere was instructed to send copies of the bill to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, to the Presidents of the two Republics, and to lay it before the Cape Legislature. It was again proposed that the representatives of the Governments who desired to avail themselves of the provisions of the bill should meet in a conference; and that the details of the federal union should then be arranged. But the preliminary steps necessary for holding the conference were delayed by circumstances; and when ultimately (in June, 1880) the proposal was brought in a definite form before the Cape Legislature, it was virtually rejected. The fact was that the danger, so long foreseen, had at length come; and a general movement of revolt which had set in among the military Bantu claimed the first energies of the new administrator.

But, before relating these circumstances, it

is necessary to refer to an event which occurred immediately after the arrival of Sir Bartle Frere. This event was the annexation of the Transvaal. Frere reached the Cape on March 31st, 1877. The British flag was raised in Pretoria on the following 12th of April, by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who acted independently, and under instructions previously received directly from the Imperial Government. Frere himself was opposed to the annexation. In his opinion, the Transvaal was like a ripe pear, which the Imperial Government should not pluck, but catch when it fell into their hands. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, however, thought that the "emergency" contemplated by his instructions had arisen; and the annexation was accomplished. This interference with the independence of the Boers was again based upon the principle to which reference has already been made. The Imperial Government claimed "the right and duty of requiring that the Transvaal should be governed with a view to the common safety of the various European communities in South Africa." At this time, the Transvaal administration was so weak that it was held to constitute a general danger. The facts upon which this opinion was based, were these. In the first place, the Boers were practically bankrupt; in the next, they were unable to reduce Sikukuni, a Kafir

chief, whose stronghold was in the mountainous country to the north-east of the Transvaal, and who was said to be Ketshwayo's "dog." Lastly, they were involved in a quarrel with Ketshwayo, and it was believed by the persons who were most competent to form an opinion on the subject, that Ketshwayo would "eat up" the Boers; and it was known that, if this took place, the triumph of the Zulus would rouse the whole Bantu population to open defiance of the Europeans.

Under these circumstances, it was obvious that the consideration of the Federation question, important though it was, must be postponed until the security of the European communities had been assured.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ZULU WAR.

WHETHER the annexation of the Transvaal at this precise moment was, or was not, a mistake, the events which followed showed that the danger upon which the action of the Imperial Government was based had not been exaggerated. The disaffection of the native population was not confined to the Zulus. Ketshwayo was the head of the movement, but he had secured the co-operation of other military tribes. On December 12th, 1878, just before the war broke out, Sir Bartle Frere wrote to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Secretary for the Colonies: "Wherever there has been disturbance and resistance to authority of Government between the Limpopo and the westernmost limits of Kafir population, there we have found unmistakable evidence" of a "common purpose and a general understanding" to contest the

supremacy of the Europeans. And the first resistance came from the Kafirs on the eastern border of the Cape Colony.

This, the last Kafir war, broke out in August, 1877—that is, four months after Frere had reached the Cape. Both the Gaikas, under Sandilli, and the Galekas, under Kreli, revolted; and although the safety of the colonists was secured from the first by prompt military measures, yet the Kafir tribes were not completely subdued until May in the following year. The nature of the fighting on the frontier, and the difficulties experienced by the Colonial troops in reducing the tribes involved in this disturbance, were such that Ketshwayo was rather encouraged than dismayed. The force over which he exercised an absolute command was infinitely superior to the untrained levies of Kreli. The Zulus were the flower of the military Bantu, and their military efficiency had at this moment been raised to the highest pitch by years of training. The methods by which Ketshwayo had produced this result, and the nature of the "man-slaying machine" itself, will appear from the following extract, taken from a despatch in which Frere justified his instructions to Lord Chelmsford to advance into Zululand (January, 1879):

"Whether his [Ketshwayo's] young men were trained into celibate gladiators as parts

of a most efficient military machine, or allowed to become peaceable cattle herds; whether his young women were to be allowed to marry the young men, or to be assegaied by hundreds for disobeying the king's orders to marry effete veterans, might possibly be Zulu questions of political economy with which the British Government were not concerned to meddle; but they were part of the great recruiting system of a military organization which enabled the king to form, out of his comparatively small population, an army, at the very lowest estimate, of 25,000 perfectly trained and perfectly obedient soldiers, able to march three times as fast as we could, to dispense with commissariat of every kind and transport of every kind, and to fall upon this [Natal] or any part of the neighbouring colony in such numbers and with such determination that nothing but a fortified post could resist them, making no prisoners and sparing neither age nor sex."

The character of Ketshwayo himself is sufficiently indicated by the reply which he made, in 1876, to the remonstrances addressed to him by the Governor of Natal in respect of the murder of some Zulu women. On that occasion he was reminded of the promises of good government which he had made to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British Representative, who was present at his coronation.

"Did I ever tell Shepstone? Did he tell the white people I made such an arrangement? Because, if he did, he has deceived them. I do kill, but do not consider yet I have done anything in the way of killing. Why do the white people start at nothing? I have not yet begun. I have yet to kill. It is the custom of our nation, and I shall not depart from it. Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws? I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, and by so doing throw the great kraal which I govern into the water. My people will not listen unless they are killed. Have I not asked the English Government to allow me to wash my spears, since the death of my father Umpandi, and they have kept playing with me all this time, and treated me like a child? Go back and tell the English that I shall act on my own account, and if they wish me to agree to their laws, I shall leave and become a wanderer; but before I go it will be seen, as I shall not go without having acted."

The position at the end of the year 1878 was summed up in Frere's statement, that "no one could really sleep in peace and security within a day's run of the Zulu border, save by sufferance of the Zulu chief." And within a day's run of the Zulu border was the small European community of Natal, consisting of some 30,000 white men, surrounded by 300,000 Kafirs.

The immediate object of Lord Chelmsford's advance was to secure the lives and property of these Natal colonists ; its ultimate object was to maintain the supremacy of the Europeans in South Africa.

Within the limits of these pages it is not possible to give any detailed account of the campaign which was commenced by Lord Chelmsford's advance across the Tugela in January, 1879. It is sufficient to note that before the Zulu man-slaying machine was broken-up at Ulundi, on July 4th, Ketshwayo had sufficiently demonstrated its power by destroying almost the entire 24th Regiment with its native supports, not by ambuscade but in the open plain by the hill of Isandlhwana. At this moment the colony of Natal was placed in extreme peril. The main body of the British force, under Lord Chelmsford, had been skilfully evaded. Between the victorious Zulu army and the colony lay Rorke's Drift, the ford by which the Buffalo River had been crossed. About 4,000 of the finest warriors were ordered to advance and secure this position. Fortunately a small force, consisting of rather more than a hundred men of the 24th, under Lieutenants Bromhead and Chard, had been left here to keep open communication with Natal. The news of the defeat of the British and of the advance of the Zulus reached them in time to allow them

to make some preparations for holding the drift. They occupied a disused mission-house, and strengthened its walls with mealy bags and biscuit tins—the actual stores, in fact, which had been left under their charge. At four in the same afternoon (January 22nd) the Zulu advance-guard, led by Ketshwayo's brother, Dabulamanzi, commenced the attack. From that time till four o'clock in the following morning they hurled themselves against the walls of the mission-house. Behind these walls the English soldiers fought with such resolution and effect, that at length the Zulu general withdrew in despair, leaving the dead bodies of three hundred of his men lying in heaps upon the ground outside. Of the English within, seventeen were dead and ten wounded. This strenuous defence, offered by a handful of brave men, with two gallant lads at their head—this, and nothing else—saved Natal. Had not Ketshwayo's triumphant advance been arrested, the Zulu *impis* would have scoured Natal. And then the Kafir population would have risen; the whole colony, except Maritzburg and Durban, with their British garrisons, would have been devastated, and the Europeans in the scattered villages and homesteads would have been at the mercy of Ketshwayo.

Beside the main column, which was led by Lord Chelmsford in person, two other

columns, respectively commanded by Colonel Pearson and Colonel (now Sir Evelyn) Wood, had entered Zululand. According to the plan of campaign, all three columns were to advance by different routes upon Ulundi, the Zulu capital, and then concentrate. As Lord Chelmsford had lost his supplies by the destruction of the camp at Isandlhwana, he was compelled to retire upon his base in Natal. The other two columns, however, remained in Zululand. Colonel Wood fortified a post at Kambula, and Colonel Pearson occupied the mission station at Etshowe. In April, Lord Chelmsford again advanced with the main column. Both Colonel Pearson and Colonel Wood had beaten back the attacks made upon them, and by this time a large number of Ketshwayo's warriors had been killed,* and many of the survivors had become cowed and disheartened. Nevertheless, Ketshwayo was able to gather from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and with this force, on July 4th, he opposed Lord Chelmsford's advance upon Ulundi. The British force consisted of about 4,000 Europeans and 1,000 native troops. It was drawn up in a hollow rectangular formation, with the infantry supported by guns, enclosing the cavalry and stores. Against this square, Ketshwayo's warriors rushed with

* It was estimated that from 1,000 to 1,500 were killed before the 24th were destroyed at Isandlhwana.

splendid discipline and courage. As the Zulus approached, leaping and shrieking, it seemed as though the black wave must flow over the slender lines of red and grey. But as it drew nearer and the crack of the rifles rang out, the wave grew less dense; and then, when it had come quite close, it bent before the hissing discharge of the gatlings, and fell broken at the very feet of the British line. But even so, before this withering fire, here and there a Zulu warrior would reach the line, and, animated by the desperate courage of his race, grasp the bayonets, and thus, by fixing their points in his breast, try to open a path for his comrades.

When at length the Zulus had broken and taken to flight, the lines opened and the cavalry rode out to complete the work.

Meanwhile, upon the news of the disaster of Isandlhwana, Lord Chelmsford had been superseded by Sir Garnet Wolseley, who did not, however, assume command of the British forces in Zululand until Ulundi had been won. By the end of August, the whole country was practically reduced. Ketshwayo himself was subsequently captured, and sent as a prisoner to Capetown; and on November 28th, Colonel Baker Russell took Sikukuni's stronghold on the Drakensberg.

By some strange process of reasoning, Sir Bartle Frere was held responsible for the

loss of the British troops in the Zulu war. Like Grey, he was accused of "disobedience," because he did not wait to communicate with the Imperial Government before he commenced the war. He was also charged with "rashness" in ordering Lord Chelmsford to advance into Zululand with the force at his disposal in January, 1879. His reply * was very simple. In answer to the first charge he advanced the fact "that, in the judgment of all military authorities, both before the war and since, it was absolutely impossible for Lord Chelmsford's force, *acting on the defensive* within the Natal boundary, to prevent a Zulu impi from entering Natal, and repeating the same indiscriminate slaughter of all ages and sexes which they boast of having effected in Natal, at Blaauw-Krantz and Weenen, in Dingaan's other massacres of forty years ago, and in the inroads into the Transvaal territory made by Umbellini, with Ketshwayo's connivance, within the last two years." In answer to the second charge he wrote: "An unexpected disaster, caused in Lord Chelmsford's absence by disregard of his orders, entailed a delay of five months and serious discouragement to us, and added enormously to the

* In memorandum contained in Cape of Good Hope Despatch, No. 9 (Jan. 13th, 1880), which contained a reply to Mr. Gladstone's speech at Glasgow, reported in *The Times* of December 6th, 1879.

military prestige of the enemy. Nevertheless, as soon as he was enabled to resume the offensive, Lord Chelmsford, moving on the same line as that he first adopted, in eight marches from the scene of the former disaster, with a column of about 6,000 Europeans, completely defeated the Zulu army and annihilated their military system. Will anyone, with this unquestionable fact before him, say I was rash in what I asked Lord Chelmsford to attempt in January with about 6,600 English soldiers, commanded by officers like Wood and Redvers Buller, Pearson and Glyn?"

In spite of this complete defence, Sir Bartle Frere was partially superseded by Lord Wolseley (who, in taking command of the troops, was also appointed High Commissioner for South East Africa), and was henceforth deprived of the confidence and support of his official superiors. Moreover, in April, 1880, the Conservative Ministry was defeated, and a Liberal Government, with Mr. Gladstone at its head, came into office. Even so, discredited and betrayed, Frere set himself resolutely to carry out his allotted task, the creation of a federal union of South African colonies and states. In this attempt he was loyally supported by the Cape Ministry of which Sir Gordon Sprigg was premier, but the question was now complicated by the agitation which had been

commenced both in England and South Africa by the Boers for the restoration of their independence. Mr. Kruger and other Boer leaders induced the Africander members of the Cape Parliament to oppose the proposal for a federation conference, on the ground that the independence of the Transvaal ought to be restored before the question of federation was discussed. On the 29th June, 1880, the Cape Ministry withdrew their proposals, and on August 1st Sir Bartle Frere was recalled.

Truly, South Africa was destined to be "the grave of reputations." Here was a man furnished with every quality necessary for a great Imperial administrator, checked, discredited, and finally recalled.

Sir Bartle Frere went to South Africa with the prestige and experience of a brilliant Indian administration. His private and public acts were governed by the highest ideals of conduct; he had the statesman's gift of placing events in their true relationship and perspective, and thus he constructed a clear vision of the future out of the materials afforded by the present and the past; he was endowed with a personal charm that won even the good will of the rugged farmers on the veldt; he had mastered the conditions of South Africa as no other man had done before.

Though he left the Cape without realizing his design of a South African Dominion

stretching from the Limpopo to Capetown, in which British energy and British justice could work unhindered and secure, he had saved a whole British colony from the direst peril, and vindicated the supremacy of the Europeans. Among the expressions of public opinion which the news of Frere's recall evoked in the Cape Colony, none is more just than the address presented to him by the people of Albany: "It was unfortunate for your personal convenience, temporarily unfortunate for your reputation, but it was extremely fortunate for Natal, and for the honour of the British name, that you were on the spot ready to sacrifice every personal consideration, and to undertake one of the heaviest and most tremendous responsibilities ever undertaken by a servant of the Crown."

CHAPTER XV.

THE REVOLT OF THE BOERS.

THE agitation of the Transvaal Boers for the restoration of their independence has already been mentioned as the immediate cause of the rejection of the federation proposals of the Sprigg ministry by the Cape Parliament in June, 1880. Lord Wolseley, who, after he had completed the subjugation of the Zulus, administered the Transvaal in 1879-80, was aware of the disaffection of the Boer population, and proposed—indeed, put in force—certain measures which he deemed necessary. But in these measures he was not supported by the Imperial Government. Before these events a deputation had proceeded to England (in 1879) to petition the Colonial Office to restore the independent Transvaal Government. This the Colonial Office had refused to do. But at the end of the same year (1879), the question was further complicated by Mr. Gladstone's adoption of

the independence of the Boers as part of the electoral programme of the Liberal party. In February of the next year (1880), an address was forwarded to him from the Africander population of the Cape Colony, praying him to use his influence on behalf of their Boer kinsmen. When, in April, Mr. Gladstone came into power, Mr. Kruger and two other delegates from the Boers visited England, and again petitioned the Imperial Government for the same object. Mr. Gladstone, however, replied that he was unable to advise the Queen to grant their request. It was on their return from England on this occasion that the Transvaal delegates procured the rejection of the federation proposals by the Cape Parliament.

The new Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner in South Africa, appointed to succeed Sir Bartle Frere, was Lord Rosmead (then Sir Hercules Robinson). Lord Rosmead did not reach the Cape until the following January (1881); and before he had reached the Cape, the Boers had resolved to appeal from diplomacy to force. The Transvaal flag was raised on the Witwatersrandt uplands on "Dingan's Day," December 16th, 1880. The English garrisons were invested and cut off. The advance of reinforcements from Natal was barred at Laing's Nek; and on February 26th, 1881, a most discreditable and disastrous defeat, in

which Sir George Colley fell, was inflicted on the British arms by the Boers at Majuba Hill.

It was curious how the situation exactly realized Sir George Grey's forecast of 1858. In that year he wrote that he thought "that many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on the north side, it might be very doubtful which of the two Governments the great mass of the [Dutch population] would obey." After the revolt had broken out, but before Lord Rosmead had arrived, the inhabitants of the Paarl district—people living within fifty miles of Capetown—sent a deputation to the Acting-Governor to support the cause of the Boers. They were apparently quite unconscious of the fact that such a deputation could not be received by the Queen's representative, since the Boers were at that moment bearing arms against the Queen's Government. The artificial separation of the Dutch inhabitants, which was the main ground on which the dismemberment of European South Africa—thirty years ago—had been justified, proved absolutely useless. The Dutch in the Transvaal were in actual conflict with the British forces; the Dutch in the Free State were in arms, and were only prevented from joining them by the strenuous exertions of President Brand. The Dutch in the Cape

Colony were in full sympathy with their kinsmen north of the Orange River, and it was doubtful whether they would restrain their sympathy within the limits of constitutional agitation.

It was in view of this very grave situation that the Imperial Government resolved to restore the independence of the Transvaal Boers. Whether Mr. Gladstone's Government was right in this decision, we are not called upon to decide. On the one hand is the fact that, if they had decided to retain the Transvaal, they would have been confronted by a struggle with the whole Dutch population in South Africa; on the other hand, it is equally certain that if the future development of that country had been foreseen, the thought of retrocession would never have been entertained. The discovery of gold in 1886, the immediate cause of the industrial development of the Transvaal, was at this date entirely unforeseen, and could not, therefore, enter into the calculations of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues. But the fact that the known existence of any such material prospects of development would have weighed down the balance on the side of retaining the country at all costs, is sufficient in itself to make us feel that the question was decided on grounds not of principle, but of policy. And, from this point of view, the sole

consideration which could justify the retrocession was the belief that it was best in the interests of South Africa as a whole. On this point grave doubts exist. For, in the first place, both the uneconomic and unprogressive character of the Boer administration and the agricultural capacity of the vast country which they claimed, were well known; and, in the next, to surrender the country in the face of the menacing attitude assumed by the entire Dutch population must inevitably produce a serious loss of prestige. The Imperial Government were bound to take into consideration not only the aspirations of the Dutch colonists, but also the conditions of the British population both in the Transvaal and throughout South Africa. And it must be remembered that this loss of prestige affected the Englishman in South Africa and the Englishman at home in very different degrees. The Englishman at home, surrounded on all sides by the evidences of his country's greatness, could afford to regard the question as purely academic. To him it mattered little or nothing whether the Boers believed that they owed their independence to the fact that they had defeated the English soldiers. But to the Englishman in South Africa, this belief, which the Boers undoubtedly entertained, brought a sense of bitter humiliation, and in some cases involved him in very grave discomforts and annoyances.

The Imperial Government, however, did their utmost to prove that it was a regard for the general interests of South Africa, and not the victory of the Burgher forces, that had determined them to restore the independent Transvaal Government. They had at once sent out ample reinforcements from England, and when the decision was actually formed, Sir Evelyn Wood, who had succeeded General Colley, could say with truth that he "held the Boers in the hollow of his hand." He had at his disposal 10,000 troops massed on the slopes of the Drakensberg; he had from his first assumption of command laid his plans with consummate ability, and he had ascertained the length of time which each English garrison could hold out, and was prepared to relieve each in turn before its supplies were exhausted. Moreover, 10,000 additional troops were on their way from England to the Cape. This was the military position when, in pursuance of the determination of the Imperial Government, Sir Evelyn Wood arranged with the Boer leaders a cessation of hostilities on March 22nd, 1881. The terms of this arrangement subsequently formed the basis of the Convention of Pretoria, under which the retrocession was, on the following 3rd of August, actually effected.

Under the terms of this Convention, full

internal freedom was restored to the Transvaal Boers. At the same time, clauses were inserted which were intended to secure the rights both of the native population, and of the British residents, in the Transvaal. The natives were protected from slavery, and were guaranteed certain elementary civil rights. It was intended by the clauses which had reference to the British residents to secure for them, and for any subsequent British immigrants, the enjoyment of precisely the same civil and political rights as the Burghers, or Boer-citizens, enjoyed. Unfortunately, however, these clauses were so loosely drafted that the Transvaal Government were afterwards enabled to introduce legislation which, maintaining the letter but evading the spirit of the Convention, has practically deprived all resident aliens, or Outlanders, of any right to participate in the government of the country; and to this circumstance is due the present strange and abnormal spectacle of a British population, living in a country over which the Imperial Government still exercises the rights and duties of paramount power, forming the majority of the population of that country, constituting its whole commercial development, and yet deprived of all political rights.

At the same time, while internal freedom was granted by the Pretoria Convention, the

external relationships of the Transvaal were wholly reserved to the Imperial Government, who were to be represented at Pretoria by a British Resident.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE.

FROM the date of the Convention of Pretoria the destinies of the Transvaal Boers have been closely connected with the strong and interesting personality of Mr. Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger. President Kruger, or "Oom Paul" (Uncle Paul), as he is called by his own people, is a characteristic product of the Franco-Dutch stock as it has grown under the very remarkable conditions of South African life. His early conflicts with man and nature in their most elementary forms, and the experience of a lifetime devoted to the sole object of preserving his primitive community from subjection to England and English ideas, have rendered him, within his own narrow sphere, the equal of the European diplomatist. His native shrewdness, aided by the opportunities afforded by the exigencies of English party government, has enabled him to emerge victorious from his long-protracted struggle with

British statesmanship. With his racy phrases, his dogged determination, his superstition, and his patriarchal simplicity of life, this nineteenth-century Cromwell stands on the page of South African history a figure at once pathetic and sublime.

It was through Mr. Kruger's diplomacy that the Transvaal obtained an enlarged freedom, and was finally placed in its present relationship to the Imperial Government. Towards the end of 1883, a delegation, consisting of Mr. Kruger and two others, visited England for the purpose of obtaining certain modifications in the Convention of Pretoria. The negotiations were conducted at the Colonial Office, between the Transvaal delegates on the one hand, and Lord Derby, then Secretary for the Colonies, and Lord Rosmead, the High Commissioner, who had returned from South Africa to advise the Colonial Office in the matter, on the other. They resulted in arrangements based upon mutual concessions. Lord Derby consented to modify certain clauses of the Convention, and Mr. Kruger agreed to the establishment of a British protectorate over the Bechuana tribes on his western border.

The matters embraced in this arrangement were very important. The present relations of the Imperial Government to the Transvaal—henceforward officially styled "The South African Republic"—were fixed by the Convention of

London, which was signed on February 27th, 1884. The line of the western frontier was at last definitely marked out, beacon by beacon, and recorded in the Convention. And at the same time the Imperial Government virtually undertook the responsibility of controlling the whole of the native population which remained outside the limits of the various European Governments.

The chief modifications introduced into the Pretoria Convention were these. In the first place, the new Convention was bi-lateral. That is to say, whereas the Convention of Pretoria, like the preceding Sand River Convention, was uni-lateral, and a mere delegation of powers conferred by a Sovereign upon an authority then and there created, the Convention of London was an agreement between two parties—the Queen of the United Kingdom and the South African Republic. In the next, the "conduct and control of diplomatic intercourse" was conceded to the Executive of the Republic, with the limitation (contained in Clause IV.) that the Queen's approval must be obtained before treaties concluded with any Power other than the Free State became valid.

In return for these concessions, the delegates undertook to co-operate with the Imperial Government in the establishment of British authority in Bechuanaland. This part of the arrangement was important in itself, and led to important results.

Bechuanaland was the district lying immediately to the north of the Cape Colony, and to the west of the South African Republic. It was inhabited by peaceable tribes, and had long been the scene of missionary enterprize. The Boers had claimed sovereignty over the whole of this country after the Sand River Convention, in virtue of the defeat which Hendrik Potgieter inflicted upon the usurper Moselekatze and his Matabele Zulus in 1838. This contention was bad, because (as we have already noticed) the Boers were, at the time of their victory, actually fighting in alliance with the Barolongs, the rightful owners of part of the country, who were then governed by Taoane, the father of Montsioa. The agreement of the delegates, that their Government should co-operate with the British Commissioner, Mr. John Mackenzie, in establishing the Queen's authority, was an important matter, because some Boer emigrants had founded settlements within the borders of the Protectorate as now defined.

At the same time as the Bechuanaland Protectorate was established, the Imperial Government issued a new commission to Lord Rosmead, which conferred upon him the new powers necessary to give effect to their determination to extend their control over the independent native population. For this purpose the High Commissioner was required and empowered by the Queen "to take all such

measures and to do all such things in relation to the native tribes in South Africa with which it is expedient that we should have relations, and which are not included within the territory of either of the Republics, or of any foreign Power, as are lawful and appear to you to be advisable for maintaining our possessions in peace and safety, and for promoting the peace, order, and good government of the tribes aforesaid, and for preserving friendly relations with them."

And so England at this moment undertook for the first time the whole of the responsibilities which belonged to her position as paramount Power, and in so doing she assumed one of the most pressing of the duties of the federal authority which she had failed to create in South Africa.

In pursuance of these arrangements, Mr. John Mackenzie arrived in Bechuanaland, as Deputy-Commissioner, in the following May. The Executive of the Republic, however, failed to give him the promised co-operation; and the Imperial Government, relying upon the prospect of an amicable settlement, had not thought it necessary to support him with any military, or, indeed, any sufficient civil, force. The Boer settlers refused to acknowledge the Queen's authority, and continued to attack the loyal chief, Montsioa. For some months, Bechuanaland remained in a state of anarchy. On

September 10th, President Kruger issued a proclamation in which, "in the interests of humanity," he declared the disturbed country to be under the jurisdiction of the Republic. Now, this proclamation, which was issued subject to the Queen's approval under Article IV. of the London Convention, meant a great deal more than the mere establishment of Boer authority over the Bechuana natives and the Boer settlements. The country which President Kruger proposed in this daring manner to add to the Transvaal constituted the trade route to Central Africa. It was the "door" which Livingstone had prevented the Boers from closing thirty years ago; the door through which British colonization has, under the guidance of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, found a path to the fertile uplands of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. In this high-handed action of the Republican Government the Cape Colonists saw a menace to their own commercial interests. Touched in their pockets, the enlightened colonists of both nationalities appealed to the Imperial Government not to allow the Protectorate to become a dead letter, nor the Colony to be robbed of its sole prospect of northward expansion.

Under these circumstances, the Imperial Government placed a sufficient military force at the disposal of Sir Charles Warren, and the Queen's authority was effectively established over the Protectorate in the early months of 1885.

Apart from the immediate objects secured, the Bechuanaland Expedition produced another useful result—it restored the military prestige of England in South Africa. Although the Boer emigrants retired before Sir Charles Warren's forces, every possible precaution had been taken in view of the contingency of a collision with them or with the forces of the Republic, and an effective display of military power was made. Moreover, part of the troops employed were recruited in the Cape Colony, and this circumstance served to remind the Republican Government that, in the case of a conflict with the Imperial Government, their own citizen forces would be opposed by Colonial volunteers.

From the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate there has been no material variation in England's South African policy. The main objects at which any British administration must aim are definitely recognised. They are nowhere more clearly expressed than in the words which Lord Rosmead used at a public banquet before his return to the Cape in 1884. These objects are: "To bring about between the variously governed European communities something approaching to uniformity of system and action upon matters of common concern; to allay and eventually extinguish race animosities between the two European sections; to provide for the protection and gradual elevation in

the scale of civilization of the natives, while arranging for that expansion of the white race which is inevitable, and which, if properly regulated, will prove of great advantage to all concerned."

These are objects which showed that the Imperial Government was at last prepared to frankly fulfil the duties of a paramount Power—that it had at last learnt to look out upon South Africa as a whole. It will be convenient, therefore, for us to consider for a moment the various parts of which this whole—the very complicated political system of South Africa—is to-day* composed. In the first place, there are two British colonies—the Cape Colony and Natal—both possessing the full political freedom of "responsible" government. The Cape Colony now includes the southern portion of Bechuanaland and the whole of the native territories (with the exception of Basutoland) which once separated its eastern border from Natal. In the second place, there are the two Republics—the South African Republic and the Free State—possessing full internal freedom, but subject to the control of the Imperial Government in their relations with Foreign

* I say *to-day*, because it would be scarcely possible within the limits of this account to indicate the various small accessions of territory, and changes, which have taken place since 1885. The history of the one great accession—Rhodesia—will be given in a subsequent chapter.

Powers. In the third place, there are certain native territories which still remain under the direct administration of the Imperial Government. These are Basutoland, a mountainous district which lies between the Free State and the British Colonies; and Khama's Country, to the north of the Cape Colony. And, lastly, there is the enormous region stretching from the colonial border northward, between German territory on the west and Portuguese territory on the east, to Lake Tanganyika, which is under the civil administration of the British South Africa Company and the military control of Imperial officers.

Thus, by the successive steps which we have traced, European colonization has gradually been extended from the Cape to the confines of Central Africa.

There is one aspect of the Bechuanaland Settlement which is too significant to be overlooked. The immediate object of the Protectorate was to secure the natives in the possession of their lands. Sir Charles Warren's instructions were: "To remove the filibusters from Bechuanaland, to pacificate the country, to reinstate the natives in their land, and to take such measures as were necessary to prevent further depredations." It is this persistent, and often wholly disinterested, interference on behalf of the native peoples that constitutes England's moral right to exercise supreme power in South

Africa. On this subject I may, perhaps, be allowed to quote some words of mine elsewhere* published :

"To the honour of England it stands written on the page of history that, from the first assumption of the government of the Cape of Good Hope, she has resolutely set herself the task of meting out justice between the conflicting claims of the Colonists and the Natives; that by assuming this attitude she rendered her government unacceptable to the mass of the original European inhabitants; but that, in the face of the difficulties and the bitter opposition thus created, she again and again compelled the most stubborn of these European offenders to do justice to the coloured races whose champion and protector she was."

* "Contemporary Review," 1896.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ERA OF GOLD DISCOVERY.

THE year which followed the settlement of Bechuanaland (the year 1886) was marked by the active introduction of the factor which has made South Africa what it is to-day—gold discovery. Little more than a bare narrative of the startling events of this epoch is required, for the sequence of cause and effect is so close that they carry their interpretation with them. In brief, the effects directly due to this factor are these. A British population has been planted in the heart of the Boer dominion which promises, by process of natural development, to recover the losses incurred through an indifferent or mistaken diplomacy. Two thousand miles of railway have been laid down; British rule has been carried from the Motopo to Lake Tanganyika, and a British colony has been founded northward of the South African Republic which will balance the numerical superiority of the Dutch colonists in the older districts; and,

lastly, the trade of South Africa has been raised from £16,000,000 in 1886, to £40,000,000 in 1896.

South Africa in 1897, showing railway lines now opened.

After lesser discoveries in the mountainous regions on the eastern border of the Transvaal, the fact of the existence of gold deposits of

unusual extent and permanency on the slope of the high veldt which falls southward into the valley of the Vaal was in this year established by the persistent energy of Mr. H. W. and Mr. F. Struben. In September, the Witwatersrandt (white-water-slope), or "the Randt," as this famous district has thenceforward been known, was declared a public gold-field. The considerable mining population already collected on the eastern fields flocked to the Randt; and in an incredibly short space of time, Johannesburg, the city of the golden reefs, had been founded on the crown of the ridge where, nearly 6,000 feet above sea level, was the richest outcrop of the conglomerate beds. In 1887, the output of gold from the Randt amounted to 34,897 oz., valued at £125,000; in 1895, it had risen to 2,277,635 oz., valued at little less than £8,000,000. Meanwhile, an ancillary industry—coal-mining—had been established; and the town of Johannesburg, with the district of which it is the centre, had been provided with the material equipment necessary for a great industry and a progressive and permanent population. In particular, the necessary arrangements for supplying the requirements of this population, and for connecting Johannesburg by railway with other South African centres, were quickly carried out. Between the years 1889 and 1892, the Government of the Cape Colony extended their central system, and carried a line through the

Free State (under an arrangement with the Free State Government), which placed Johannesburg in direct communication with Capetown and Port Elizabeth. In 1894, the railway from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria (and thence to the Randt) was opened. Before the end of 1895, Natal had extended its main line to the northern limit of its frontier, and, in connection with auxiliary lines within the Transvaal, had united Johannesburg with Durban. As to the growth of Johannesburg itself, the Sanitary Board's census of October, 1896, showed a population of 102,078 persons residing within a three-mile radius of the Market Square; and of this total, 50,907 were Europeans.

Other results even more remarkable followed the establishment of the gold industry on this large scale. When the output of 1887 confirmed the estimate of the value of the gold deposits of the Randt, men's minds turned to the older scenes of gold discovery, the regions northward of the Limpopo. It was here that the early gold-explorers had searched—Hartley, Baines, and Karl Mauch. Here, too, were the remains of the temple-fortresses which attested the extent of Phœnician or Sabæan mining enterprize, and pointed to this region as a probable source of the supply of gold which enriched alike King Solomon and Imperial Rome. This region, which was marked "Imperium Monomotapæ" on the Portuguese and "Ophir" on the

Dutch maps, lay under the dominion of Lobengula, king of the Matabele tribe. In 1840, Umziligazi, Lobengula's father, and the son of Moselekatze—who had been driven northward of the Limpopo by Hendrik Potgieter in 1838—invaded the country with his Matabele warriors. It was then occupied by a tribe of industrial Bantu, the Mashonas. Umziligazi, adopting the customary procedure of the military Bantu, exterminated the inhabitants of the district which he had chosen for the residence of his Matabele followers, and made the remainder his slaves and vassals. In 1887, it was rumoured that the Boers, baffled in their attempts to colonize Bechuanaland, intended to establish settlements in this country. In order to prevent this extension of the South African Republic, a treaty was made early in 1888, under which Lobengula bound himself not to enter into any negotiations with a foreign Power without the knowledge and consent of the High Commissioner. In October of the same year, a party of adventurous Englishmen visited Lobengula's court, and obtained from him a "concession" of the sole right to search for, and work, the minerals within his territory. This concession—the Rudd concession—was the germ of the Chartered Company. In 1889, an association, of which Mr. Cecil Rhodes was the leading spirit, was formed for the purpose of giving effect to the Rudd concession. The

association was afterwards recognized by the Imperial Government, and on October 29th a charter was conferred upon it, under the title of the British South Africa Company. In applying for their charter, the members of the association stated their objects to be these:

To extend northwards the railway and telegraph systems in the direction of the Zambesi;

To encourage emigration and colonization;

To promote trade and commerce;

To develop and work mineral and other concessions ..... securing to the native chiefs and their subjects the rights reserved to them under the several concessions.

As the British sphere of influence had been extended northwards to the Zambesi shortly after the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Lord Knutsford, the Colonial Secretary, was of opinion that such a company would be useful in developing the country, and would, at the same time, "relieve H.M. Government from diplomatic difficulties and heavy expenditure."

Immediately upon the grant of the charter, Mr. Rhodes, the managing director in South Africa, made an arrangement with the Government of the Cape Colony under which the first section of the northern extension of the railway—from Kimberley to Vryburg—was at once commenced. At the same time a police force was enlisted, and in course of time moved up to the Macloutsie River. From this point

the Pioneer Expedition started on June 28th, 1890. On September 12th, they reached Fort Salisbury. They had made a road four hundred miles in length, through forest, swamp, and river; and had established forts, with lines of communication, at Tuli, Victoria, and Charter. On the 29th, the pioneers disbanded and proceeded to prospect for gold, and to take up farms, under the protection of the police force. The settlers, who were placed under the authority of Mr. A. R. Colquhoun, experienced great difficulties. Owing to the opposition of the Portuguese—an opposition which was extinguished by the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of June 11th, 1891—it was impossible to open up communication with the east coast at Beira. The thousand Europeans were driven to draw their supplies of food and other necessaries from the Cape Colony; that is, they were, in effect, 1,700 miles from the sea, and the cost of carriage was £70 a ton. At the end of 1891 Mr. Colquhoun was succeeded by Dr. Jameson. The new administrator cut down the cost of the administration by reducing the police, and by organizing a volunteer force which practically included all the able-bodied men in the country. It was not supposed at this time that the services of these men would be required, for Lobengula had appeared well satisfied with the stipend or subsidy of £100 a month which was regularly paid to him by the Chartered Company.

But in July, 1893, when some considerable progress had been made under Dr. Jameson's skilful administration, and it became evident that a permanent settlement of the country would be effected, Lobengula's attitude suddenly changed, and a conflict broke out which resulted in the capture of Buluwayo, the death of Lobengula, and the destruction of the Matabele rule.

It was Lobengula's habit to maintain his authority by sending his *impis* once a year to visit the Mashona villages, for the purposes of indiscriminate murder and pillage. In the course of this annual duty, the Matabele soldiers attacked some Mashonas who were living under the protection of the Chartered Company in the neighbourhood of Fort Victoria. When remonstrances were made, the king offered no redress, but defied both Dr. Jameson and the High Commissioner. Under these circumstances, it was plain that either the white settlers must leave the country, or Lobengula's system must be destroyed. Dr. Jameson, having obtained the necessary authority from Lord Rosmead, then organized the military resources at his disposal, and prepared to invade the king's territory. On November 4th, Buluwayo, the Matabele capital, was occupied; and shortly afterwards the king himself perished in flight.

In these operations only forty-six Europeans were killed, and, of this total, thirty-six perished

in a single disaster. This disaster, the death of Major Allan Wilson and thirty-five others on the Shangani River, is at once the most pathetic and the most splendid incident in the Matabele War.

After the capture of Buluwayo, a patrol, some three hundred strong, under Major Forbes, was sent forward to pursue and capture Lobengula. On December 3rd, Major Allan Wilson and eighteen men were detached from this patrol and sent across the Shangani river to reconnoitre. At night Wilson sent back three men to say that the king was only six miles ahead, but that there were more natives than he expected, and that it would be well for the whole force to be moved forward as quickly as possible. It was impossible, however, for Major Forbes to advance before the next morning, and he therefore sent twenty men under Captain Brown with supplies and ammunition to support Major Wilson, at the same time leaving him (Wilson) to decide whether he would fall back or not. At daybreak Major Forbes prepared to advance, and soon afterwards heavy firing was heard from across the Shangani. In advancing, the main force was itself attacked by the Matabele, and this caused a delay of one hour. At eight o'clock three men came back from Wilson's party, and reported that they had ridden up to the king's scherm; that they had been attacked and had retired, and were again attacked and in urgent need of support.

Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the river had risen, Major Forbes was unable to advance to their assistance, and could only wait in the hope that they would be able to fight their way back.

The story of their death was learnt subsequently from the Matabele. The party beat off the original attack from the waggons, but in retreating they rode into the *impi* sent, on December 2nd, to attack the patrol in ambush. The surrounded troopers dismounted and formed a ring with their horses outwards; as the horses fell they used their bodies for a barricade. Thus protected, they fought for several hours, and twice repulsed the enemy. Indeed, had not their ammunition been exhausted, they would have finally beaten the Matabele back. The troopers fought with singular determination and coolness. One man would calmly take off his shirt, tear it into strips and bind up his comrade's wounds, and the wounded men fought on with the rest. In the centre of the recumbent group, Major Allan Wilson stood upright and gave his orders. When the ring was broken through, and the few that lay alive among the bodies of the horses had been despatched by assegai stabs, the Matabele stripped the bodies; but for a long time they left Major Allan Wilson's body untouched. He had stood so long, fearless, and unscathed by their furious attacks, that they thought he bore a charmed life.

Such was the death of Wilson's party. It needs no memorial—though one has since been raised to their memory—to keep the story fresh in the minds of Englishmen. For it is by such men that the Empire has been made.

A year later, a European town of brick houses, with churches, clubs, and newspapers, was growing up within a mile of the site of Lobengula's chief kraal.

In the closing months of 1895, everything seemed to promise a period of rapid and peaceful development to the settlers of Rhodesia, as the new colony had come to be called in honour of its founder. Prospecting for gold and general mining operations were going on briskly, the value of land in Buluwayo and at Salisbury had quickly risen, and farms and pastoral properties were being taken up by immigrants, both Dutch and English.

These prospects were suddenly interrupted by the "Jameson raid," as the intervention of the Administrator in the affairs of the South African Republic is commonly termed.

As we have already seen, the Imperial Government intended, under the Convention of Pretoria, to secure equal political and civil rights for the British population then residing in the Transvaal, and for any future British immigrants; but, through careless drafting, the clauses intended to give effect to this purpose were either wholly omitted or insufficiently exact.

The British immigrants were, by a series of enactments, practically deprived of all prospect of obtaining the franchise—that is, of taking part in the administration of the country in which they lived. The injustice of this attitude on the part of the Executive was emphasized by the fact that, owing to the presence of the "Outlanders," the Republic had been raised to a position of great financial prosperity, and, indeed, it was calculated that the "Outlanders" at this time owned half the land and paid seven-eighths of the taxes. After more than one unsuccessful appeal to the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office, the British residents organized a Reform Committee, and finally resolved to take up arms. On December 26th, 1895, this committee issued a manifesto; and on the 29th, Dr. Jameson crossed the border with a force of about five hundred of the Chartered Company's mounted police, which he had assembled at Mafeking and Pitsani Pitlogo, with the intention of supporting the reformers at Johannesburg. Owing to a delay at Krugersdorp, occasioned by a misunderstanding between the reform leaders and Dr. Jameson, the force was surrounded by the burgher levies of the Republic, and on January 2nd, 1896, it surrendered to the Boers. By the strenuous efforts of Lord Rosmead and Mr. Chamberlain, President Kruger was prevailed upon to hand over his prisoners to the

Imperial Government. The members of the Reform Committee were tried by the Republican Government, and on April 28th, at Pretoria, sentence of death was passed upon the four leaders, and sentences of imprisonment for various terms were passed upon the rest. These sentences were, however, afterwards commuted, and, in the end, all—with four exceptions*—were set at liberty, upon payment of fines and upon giving a pledge not to interfere in the politics of the state in future. Dr. Jameson and five of the officers who served under him were brought to trial at the Royal Courts of Justice in London; and on July 29th they were convicted of an offence under the Foreign Enlistment Act, *viz.*: the offence of fitting-out an expedition against a friendly state, to wit, the South African Republic. They were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment; and, in addition to this punishment, the officers lost their commissions.

Certain changes in the *personnel* of the Chartered Company followed the raid.

According to the finding of the South Africa

* These exceptions are significant. One man died in gaol at Pretoria; two refused to submit to any sentence on the ground that, when Johannesburg laid down its arms, the Imperial Government had given a guarantee that the reformers should be unmolested. These two men have been since released. The fourth, Colonel Rhodes, refused to give the pledge of non-interference, and was therefore outlawed.

Committee,* which sat during the first six months of 1897 to enquire into the circumstances of the "Jameson raid," Mr. Rhodes was responsible for the arrangements which had been made for supporting the Johannesburg reformers, although he had not given his direct approval of the precise step which constituted the offence of which Dr. Jameson was convicted.

This finding no doubt embodied the truth; and, at any rate, Mr. Rhodes retired from the Premiership of the Cape Colony on January 6th, 1896—that is, four days after Dr. Jameson's surrender to the Boers—and he was subsequently removed from his position of managing director of the Company in South Africa. Dr. Jameson was succeeded by Lord Grey as Administrator. Moreover, in response to the urgent representations of the Republican Government, the military forces of the Company in Rhodesia had been at once placed under the direct control of an Imperial officer; and shortly afterwards Sir Richard Martin was appointed, and sent out, as Commandant-General of the local forces, and Deputy-Commissioner.

But a more important and far-reaching result of the raid was the deadly struggle in which the Rhodesian settlers were involved with the Matabele.

*Appointed by order of the House of Commons, dated July 26th, 1896.

While Lord Grey and Sir Richard Martin were still on their way to Rhodesia, and the civil administration had been temporarily placed in the hands of Judge Vintcent at Salisbury and Mr. Duncan at Buluwayo, the news came to the latter that on the night of March 20th a native policeman had been murdered. This was followed on the 24th by the still more disquieting intelligence of the murder of a Government official, Mr. Bentley, and of other Europeans. It was soon plain that the whole native population was in revolt, and, on the 26th, Buluwayo went into laager. On April 1st the Buluwayo field force was organized, and on the 5th a census was taken which showed that there were 1,547 persons in the town, of whom 632 were women and children and 915 were men. Among these latter, 800 were effective; and of these, 400 were required to garrison the town, 130 were despatched to the Mangwe road to keep open the line of communication with Cape Colony, and 300, aided by a force of 150 Cape Boys, were available for the work of bringing in the inhabitants of the outlying farmsteads and mining camps.

The little community was 600 miles from the railway terminus at Mafeking, and from civilization. Fortunately the telegraph enabled them to convey the news of their desperate situation to the High Commissioner at Capetown, and to the Imperial Government in

London. Lord Rosmead at once instructed Colonel Plumer to raise a body of colonial troopers. This force (which eventually numbered 720 men) was recruited mainly from Kimberley, and its ranks were joined by a number of the disbanded troopers who had served with Dr. Jameson. It was assembled and organized at Mafeking, and by April 12th—about a fortnight after Lord Rosmead's orders had been given—the first detachment had started for Buluwayo. On April 15th, Lord Grey, who was now in the colony, accepted the Imperial Government's offer of 300 men of the 7th Hussars and 150 mounted infantry from Natal. These men were sent by sea to East London, and were then forwarded by rail through the Cape Colony to Mafeking. On the 18th, a relief column, accompanied by Mr. Rhodes, left Salisbury. On the 17th, the Imperial Government determined to send out a general officer to take command of the entire forces, imperial and local, and General Sir Frederick Carrington—the late commandant of the Bechuanaland Border Police—was summoned from Gibraltar for this service. On the 25th, he sailed for South Africa.

On the 28th, Lord Grey got through to Buluwayo with a welcome supply of arms and ammunition. His disposition was worthy of the difficult and responsible task which he had assumed. On May 3rd, he declared that when

the rebellion broke out the administration had only 379 rifles at its disposal, but that now Buluwayo was "as safe as London." As safe as London! Outside the town, in a semi-circle from the west to the north-east, 10,000 Matabele warriors were hidden in the bush; while, further to the south-east, the great mass of the native population of the country had assembled in arms among the mountain fastnesses of the Matoppo range. But Lord Grey was right. Thanks to the determined bravery of the settlers themselves, and thanks to the rapidity with which these various measures of relief were executed, the little community was "as safe as London."

On May 15th, Colonel Plumer and Sir Richard Martin reached Buluwayo; on the 30th, the Salisbury column had got through; and on June 2nd, General Carrington arrived to assume command of the entire military operations. From this time forward, the work of subjugation went on rapidly.

In order to hasten the conclusion of the war, and to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the High Commissioner issued a proclamation promising a free pardon to all the Matabele who should surrender their arms by August 10th. Natives, however, who might be convicted in the Courts of the murder of unprotected Europeans, were excepted from its benefits. For this and other reasons the insurgent chiefs showed no readiness

to surrender, and the date of the expiration of the proclamation was subsequently extended. While the chiefs were still hesitating, and the Matoppos remained crowded with armed Matabele, Mr. Rhodes determined to try the effect of friendly persuasion. For this purpose, he and a party of civilians, including Mr Colenbrander, encamped at the base of the hills. The party were without any military protection, and the risk which Mr. Rhodes incurred by such a proceeding can only be understood by bearing in mind the treacherous character of the methods of warfare too frequently adopted by the Bantu. Indeed, it is only just to state that during the whole of the war Mr. Rhodes displayed an entire disregard of his personal safety. When the Salisbury column was in action, he exposed himself with an almost contemptuous indifference to the guns and assegais of the rebels. But the enterprize upon which he was now engaged was infinitely more dangerous.

After some delay, information was brought that the chiefs, who had been consulting among themselves, were willing to receive Mr. Colenbrander and the great white chief, Rhodes, at an indaba or council, which was to be held at a place in the mountains about four miles from the camp. Accordingly, on August 23rd, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Colenbrander, and four others, one of whom was a representative of the press,

proceeded into the heart of the rebel position. All the members of the party except Mr. Rhodes carried revolvers, but these were their only arms. Although they saw no sign of human beings, they knew that the whole mountain-side was filled with armed Matabele; and though this bold experiment proved entirely successful, we may be sure that there was not one of these six brave men that did not think of the fate that befell Pieter Retief and his comrades sixty years before in Dingan's town. When the chosen place had been reached, Mr. Rhodes sat down, and one of the party went forward to a round hill or kopje close by to inform Secombo and his brother chiefs that the white men had come. Soon afterwards, the Matabele chiefs rose mysteriously from the middle of the kopje, and advancing in a solemn procession, headed by a white flag, gravely seated themselves in a semi-circle before Mr. Rhodes. The indaba lasted for five hours, and during this long consultation the grievances of the chiefs were carefully discussed, and the present and future plans of the Chartered Company were explained. In the end, each chief threw two pieces of stick at the feet of Mr. Rhodes; the first indicated that the thrower would surrender his gun, and the second, that he would surrender his assegai. In return, Mr. Rhodes promised on behalf of the Government that the abolition of the native police—the great grievance of which the chiefs

complained—should be seriously considered. Then the chiefs disappeared again into the kopje, and Mr. Rhodes and his party descended safely to their camp.

Of Mr. Rhodes's services during the six weeks that he remained at the base of the Matoppos, in a camp "unprotected by a single bayonet, which could have been perfectly well rushed any night," Lord Grey wrote: * "It was entirely due to the confidence which this action on his part inspired in the minds of the rebels, who were very suspicious and alarmed as to the treatment they would receive if they surrendered, that they were at length induced to go out from the hills into the flats."

Nevertheless, the fires of the rebellion smouldered—for the Mashonas in the neighbourhood of Salisbury also took up arms—until the beginning of the next year, and then gradually the settlers returned from the shelter of the towns to the blackened ruins of their farmsteads and mining-camps.

Since then all necessary measures have been taken, both by the Imperial Government and the Chartered Company, to render the property and the persons of the colonists secure. At the same time the foundations of the industrial progress of Rhodesia have been well and truly laid The telegraph was carried through the country as

* Letter of October 11th, to Secretary of the Chartered Company.

early as 1892; and to-day the wires run northward from Salisbury to Blantyre, the capital of British Nyassaland, eastward to Beira on the east coast, and southward to Capetown and Europe. The east coast railway has been built from Beira to the Portuguese boundary, a distance of one hundred and seventy miles, in the direction of Salisbury and Umtali. The railway system of the Cape Colony has been carried northwards for eight hundred miles in the direction of the Zambesi. The first section, from Kimberley to Vryburg, was completed on December 3rd, 1890; the second section, from Vryburg to Mafeking, on October 3rd, 1894; and the third section, which to-day unites Buluwayo with Capetown—a distance in all of 1,350 miles—was opened on November 4th, 1897, the fourth anniversary of the occupation of Lobengula's capital by the forces of the Chartered Company.

The opening of the Buluwayo railway affords a fitting conclusion to "the story of South Africa" as we can tell it now. It is the last and most significant sign of those advances in material prosperity which, primarily arising out of the search for gold, together constitute a great development in the direction of South African unity. For these advances are alike the cause and effect of ever-widening manifestations of British enterprize; and they contain a promise that the administrative genius of the Anglo-Saxon race, aided by those two mighty

assessors, the printing-press and the railway, which it has now summoned to its side, will at no distant date unite the diverse European elements, and enable Capetown to realize its dream

> Of Empire to the northward. Ay, one land
> From Lion's head to Line.

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